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THE FUNCTION OF WILL CONTESTS*

Lewis M. Simest

I
INTRODUCTION

T

O any~ne steeped in the doctrines of the common law there is
something anomalous about the will contest. First, the will is
duly admitted to probate in a proceeding which is almost universally
conceded to be judicial. Then at a subsequent time a so-called contest
is brought by the heir, in which the precise proposition determined on
the probate is retried. In most jurisdictions the heir is not bound to
make any sort of a showing to entitle him to contest. He need not
allege newly discovered evidence. He need not submit any evidence of
·fraud or mistake. Indeed, in some states, he may even have attended
the original probate proceeding and sat by without a murmur of dissent
while the will was judicially approved. Yet the law says he may now,
merely for the asking, wipe out the effect of the decree admitting the
will to probate and have the whole matter heard anew. This is not appeal in any true sense of the word, though in many jurisdictions it is
called an appeal with trial de novo; nor is it a hearing on certiorari,
though such a hearing may sometimes be granted by a still higher
court with respect to the contest itself. It is not a new trial for cause;
since, in most states, no cause need be shown. It is, in short, a unique
sort of hearing which finds its only justification as a part of a legal system in the uniqueness of the matters with which it deals.
It is, of course, obvious that these observations do not apply to a
contest which is a part of, and the same as, the original probate proceeding. If a will is presented to the court by a devisee or executor to
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be probated and an heir puts the proponent's allegations in issue, the
trial of that issue at that point in the proceeding is quite as much in
accord with the spirit of our legal system as the trial of the due execution of a contract when a promisee brings an action for its breach. But
no one ever heard of the contest of a contract or of a deed, separate and
apart from the original action on that contract or deed. And unless the
probate of a will possesses peculiarities all its own, it is difficult to -see
why probate should be regarded as distinct from contest.
It is the primary purpose of this paper to consider what are the
proper functions of will contests. In this connection, statutes and case
law dealing with the various aspects of will contests will be considered
with a view to determining what is the underlying theory of the will
contest in the various jurisdictions and whether various subsidiary rules ,
concerning it are consistent with that theory. By way of conclusion,.we
shall attempt to determine what should be the rationale of an ideal
piece of legislation on will contest. We shall deal chiefly with the socalled contest after probate, since contest before probate is ordinarily
nothing more than a determination of the due execution of the will
as an issue in the probate proceeding. But it should be noted that in
some jurisdictions legislation appears to indicate that a contest before
probate is also more or less distinct from probate itself. Certainly that
type of legislation should come in for consideration in connection with
any adequate treatment of the function of contest.
It is hoped, moreover, that a clear understanding of the nature and
function of will contests will tend to reduce litigation and to result in
more coh~rent legislation. Though it may not reduce directly the number of will contests, yet, if the law is clarified, the number of appeals
from will contests should be substantially decreased. Moreover, if
suitable limitations on will contests are inserted in statutes which deal
with them, contests should also be less frequent.
Up to this point the meaning of the term "will contest" has been
assumed. But before proceeding, it should be made explicit. The expression "will contest," 1 as used in this paper, means any proceeding or
I

1

Although the term "will contest" has come into almost universal use in the
United States, it has seldom been used in England. However, an early edition of Jarman on Wills refers to a legatee as "having contested the validity or effect of a will."
JARMAN, A TREATISE ON THE CoNSTRUCTION OF DEVISES, 22 Law Library, *p. 296
(1838). It has been suggested that the term comes from the "litis contestatio" of
Roman law. See In re Cronin's Will, 257 N.Y.S. 496 at 503, 143 Misc. 559 (1932)
and Clemens v. Patterson, 38 Ala. 721 at 722 (1863). As to the 'litis contestatio" in
Roman law, see BucKLAND, A TEXTBOOK. OF RoMAN LAw, 2d ed., 695 (1932). As
to its application to procedure in the ecclesiastical courts, see CoNSET, PRACTICE OF THE
SPIRITUAL CouRTS, 3d ed., 85 (1708); LANGDELL, EQUITY PLEADING xv (1877);
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part of a proceeding in which the question whether a given instrument
is the duly e::xecuted and unrevoked will of a competent testator is put
in issue. It is to be distinguished from a mere ex parte probate proceeding in which no allegations of the proponent of a will are controverted. The term is not limited to statutory proceedings designated
as contests, but is used to include any proceeding to admit a will to probate in which its execution or revocation is put in issue; it includes an
appeal from an order admitting a will to probate in which the issue is
tried de novo; a proceeding to revoke the probate of a will; a probate
in solemn form; an action at law in the nature of ejectment or trespass
in which the issue of will or no will is tried; a chancery proceeding in
which the issue is the due execution of a will. In short, practically any
proceeding in which the due execution or revocation of a will is put in
issue is a contest.
This paper, however, does not deal with the constructive trust as a
device to give effect to a will discovered after administration is closed;
nor with an action of tort brought by a devisee of an unprobated will
against an heir who has wrongfully destroyed the will. Yet each of
these situations may involve a determination of the due execution of
the will. Nor do we consider the contest of foreign wills, or of nuncupative wills, or of lost or destroyed wills, since such minor differences
in the law of contest as may be found there add nothing to our understanding of the matter of function.

II
PROBATE AND CONTEST• IN ENGLISH LAW

Since American probate procedure is modeled after the English
pattern, it is important to consider what constituted will contest in England. Prior to 1857, wills involving personalty were probated in the
ecclesiastical court. From the time when the first edition of Swinburn
on Wills appeared until courts of probate were set up shortly after the
middle of the 19th century, the procedure seems not to have greatly
varied.2. Probate could be either in common form or in solemn form,
3 BURN, EccLESIASTICAL LAw, 9th ed., 189 (1842). CoNSET, cited supra this note,
371, refers to the will as being "contested."
The term "contest" appears in American statute law as early as 1711. See Va.
Laws, Act of Nov. 1711, c. 2, in 4 Va. Stat. L. (Hening, 1820) 14.
2
SwINBURN, A BRIEFE TREATISE oF TESTAMENTS AND LAST WILLES 224, 225
(1590). The following discussions of the subject appear to be patterned more or less
after Swinburn: GonoLPHIN, ORPHANS LEGACY, 3d ed., 62 (1685); I WILLIAMS,
ExEcUToRs, Amer. ed., *188-195 (1832); 4 BURN, EccLESIASTICAL LAW, 9th ed.,
315-322 (1842); LovELAss, THE LAw's DISPOSAL OF A PERSON'S ESTATE WHo
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the latter being also described as probate in form of law or probate per
testes. If in common form, the proceeding was summary; no notice
was given to anyone. The will could be. admitted to probate on the
mere oath of the executor that he believed it to be duly executed,
though additional proof was sometimes required. It is commonly stated
that at any time within thirty years 8 after the wiII had been adn:iitted
to probate in common form it could be proved anew in solemn form;
although it is not entirely clear that there was any time limit. Or, the
executor or .some other interested party could have secured its probate
in solemn form in the. first instance and before any other probate was
sought. When probate was in solemn form, notice was given to interested parties who were permitted to oppose the admission of the
will; and the attesting witnesses were produced to testify in support of
the will.
Until the latter part of the nineteenth century,4 a will, in so far
as it involved freehold interests in land, was not subject to probate in
the sense in which a will of personalty was said to be probated. That is
to say the will was regarded as passing the title to land automaticaIIy
on the death of the testator, just as a deed passes title on its delivery.
The validity of the will might be determined incidentally in an action
of trespass or ejectment involving the land devised. But the judgment
determined the matter·only as between the parties as of the time when
the action was brought. Just as in the case of title by deed, any number
of subsequent actions of trespass or ejectment might be brought with
varying results.
Drns WITHOUT WILL OR TESTAMENT; TO WHICH JS ADDED THE DISP®AL OF A PERSON'S ESTATE BY WILL AND TESTAMENT, 25 Law Library, from the 1.2th London ed.,
*408-410 (1839).
8
Swinburn says there is a presumption of due execution of a will after ten years.
Most other writers say that the will cannot be proved in solemn form after thirty
,years. In 4 BuRN, EccLESIASTICAL LAw, 9th ed., 318 (1842), it is suggested that the
word "ten" in Swinbuµi is a misprint for "thirty." It is possible that there may be
some connection between this rule and the rule of evidence as to the presumed authenticity of documents after thirty years. See 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., § 2138
(1940). The rule as to wills of personalty, however, is said to involve a period of
thirty years after probate in common fonn; while the evidence rule, when applied to
wills of land, has been held to mean thirty years from the execution of the will. See
Doe d. Oldham v. Wolley, 8 B. & C. 22 (1828). It has been said that the.re is _no
recognized time limit on the probate of wills in solemn fonn in the ecclesiastical courts.
See FouRTH REPORT BY THE CoMMISSIONERS APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO THE LAw
oF ENGLAND RESPECTING REAL PROPERTY 39 (1833); REPORT BY THE·CoMMISSIONERS TO INQUIRE INTO THE PRACTICE AND JURISDICTION OF THE EccLESIASTICAL
CouRTS IN ENGLAND AND WALES 37 (1832); Richardson v. Claney, .2 Phillimore 228,
note (a), at 231 (1802).
4 In The G~ds of John Bootle, L:R. 3.P. & D. 177 (1874).
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It is true, equity would sometimes take steps to have a devise of
land proved; but the result added up to no more than what was permissible in the court of law. Thus, a devisee might, under certain
circumstances, go into equity and ask to have his title determined. 5
Chancery would direct the devisee and heir to frame an issue of devisavit vel non and have it tried in an action at law before a jury.
When the court of equity became satisfied, after one or more verdicts
at law, that title was in the devisee and that the will was good, interference by the heir might be enjoined. The devisee might also file a
bill in equity to perpetuate testimony and the court would compel the
attesting witnesses to come in and testify. These two procedures were
sometimes denominated proving the will in equity,6 just as the trespass
or ejectment action was sometimes described as proving the will at
law. 7 The following succinct statement from Adams on Equity indicates the precise extent to which Equity established a will of land: 8
"The validity of a will of real estate, and of the consequent
title of the devisee, is triable only by the Courts of common law.
If the devisee being out of possession seeks to enforce the will, or
if the heir being out of possession seeks to set it aside, their respective modes of doing so are by ejectment at law. If there be outstanding terms or other legal impediment, they may respectively
come into equity to have them removed. If either party being in
possession fears that his possession may be subsequently disturbed,
he may perpetuate the testimony on a proper bill; or if after a
satisfactory verdict and judgment,. he is harassed by repeated
ejectments, he may have an injunction to restrain them on a bill of
peace. But neither party can resort to the Court of Chancery as a
tribunal for the trial of the will. If, however, there be a trust to
perform or assets to administer, so that the will is drawn within
the cognizance of equity, there is an incidental jurisdiction to
declare the will is established, after first directing an issue devisavit vel non, to try its validity at law. By the old practice it was
necessary to establish a will against the heir, whenever the Court
was called upon to execute its trusts, b~t the rule is now abolished.
G Pemberton v. Pemberton, 13 Vesey 290 (1807); Bootle v. Blundell, 19 Vesey
494 (1815); Tatham v. Wright, 2 Russ & My. I (1831); Lowe v. Joliffe, I Wm.
Black. 365 (1762); Mountain v. Bennet, I Cox Ch. 353 (1787), 2 Dick. 683 (1787),
3 WooDDESSON, LECTURES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND, 2d ed., 477-479 (1834); z
STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, 1st ed., 671 (1836).
6
See PowELL, DEVISES, 1st Am. ed., 714 (1807). As to the bill to perpetuate
testimony, see I HARRISON, CHANCERY, 7th ed., 784 (1790); 2 id. 282.
7 See PowELL, DEVISES, 1st Am. ed., 702 (1807).
8
ADAMS, EQUITY, 2d Am. ed., *249 (1852).
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The issue devisavit vel non, when a declaration of establishment
is asked, is demandable as of right by the heir; for he can be disinherited only by the verdict of a jury. But he may waive this
right by his conduct."
Such was the system of will contest in England at a time when
American jurisdictions were taking over English legal principles.
Clearly illogical in sharply differentiating land and personalty, it
_ merely gave another expression to a distinction which runs all through
English common law. It may not be possible to state with certainty,
and perhaps it would be futile to attempt to do so, wl_iy the ecclesiastical
courts took over the disposition of a dead man's personalty but not his
realty. Even as to the personalty it was said not to be by common right
but only by English custom,9-whatever that may mean. But the upshot of the matter seems to have been that the church desired to have a
hand in disposing of a dead man's estate, a part of which he commonly
wished to appropriate for the good of his soul.10 Obviously land was
too important in a feudal society to be entrusted to religious tribunals;
for in those days, land was government, land was social status, in short,
land was the very foundation of the social order.
Conceding that the interplay of compromise must have resulted in
giving probate of wills of personalty to the ecclesiastical courts and
such probate as there was of wills of realty to the secular courts, this
does not explain the wide diversity in the two concepts of probate. Nor
is any adequate explanation forthcoming; yet the theory of each was
perfectly rational. Probate in the ecclesiastical court was the authentication of a document. This authentication was contemporaneous with the
grant of authority to the personal representative; it did not determine
the legal effect of the will. But it said to the executor: "The testator
made this will; he appointed you his executor. Take his personal
estate and administer it according to the terms of the will."
On the other hand, the determination of the validity of a will of
land in a court of law was essentially an inter partes determination of
the title to a particular piece of.land. It decided both the validity and
the legal effect of the will in giving title to the devisee. But it decided
this only as it decided the validity of a deed when an action of trespass
or ejectment put in issue the title to particular land which it purported
to convey.
In the case of the will of personal property, the contest was ob9 GonoLPHIN, ORPHANS LEGACY, 3d ed., 59 (1685), "de Consuetudine Angliae
& non de Communi Jure."
,
10
See 2 PoLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, 2d ed., 332

(1911).

,
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viously the probate in solemn form. That it could come after probate
in common form did not in any way indicate that the law permitted
two trials of the same issue. Probate in common form was no trial.
Indeed, it has been definitely asserted by an eminent authority on English ecclesiastical law 11 that it was not a judicial proceeding. Essentially it was a mere formal administrative authentication of the
instrument; 12 and the contest-the probate in solemn form-was the
first and only real hearing of the issue of due execution. There were
two good reasons for permitting probate in common form without
notice before probate in solemn form. First, in the vast majority of
cases there would never be any contest or any disagreement of interested parties as to the distribution of the estate. Hence a system which
reduced the formalities to a minimum was desirable. Second, even if
a later contest might take place, the preservation of the estate demanded that a responsible person take charge of it as soon as possible
after the death of the testator; and to delay until notice to interested
parties and a hearing on the will was had would in many instances permit a wasting of the estate.18
Contest in the case of real estate recognized even more fully that
no litigation about the will is necessary in the ordinary situation. Its
underlying theory was this: Contest takes place only when the title to
devised land is put in issue. It operates to authenticate the instrument
only to the extent that the judgment in that case is an estoppel between
the parties.14
It thus appears that broadly speaking the theory of contest in the
11
In 2 PHILLIMORE, EccLESIASTICAL LAw 1210 (1873), it is pointed out that
the voluntary jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical court, including the granting of probate
of wills, is not a judicial proceeding. The learned author therefore concludes that
when the bishop selects a subordinate to act in voluntary proceedings, he is delegating
the function; but if it were a true judicial function, the subordinate would be acting as
judge for himself, since a judicial function cannot be delegated.
12 See FOURTH REPORT BY THE CoMMISSIONERS APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO THE
LAw OF ENGLAND RESPECTING REAL PROPERTY 55 (1933); REPORT BY THE CoMMISS1ONERs TO INQUIRE INTO THE PRACTICE AND JURISDICTION OF THE EccLESIASTICAL COURTS IN ENGLAND AND WALES 37 (1832).
18 "A very little consideration will show that it would be absolutely impossible to
establish any a priori guards or cautions, which would not, from the delay and expense,
occasion an infinitely greater loss to the Public, than may sometimes arise from what is
called snatching Probate of a paper, afterwards found not entitled thereto. Any notice
to Heirs-at-law, next of Kin, prior Devisees, or Legatees, would be found utterly incompatible with that expedition and economy, which are the most essential ingredients
in the administration of every-day justice." REPORT BY THE CoMMISSIONERs TO INQUIRE INTO THE PRACTICE AND JURISDICTION OF THE EccLESIASTICAL CoURTS IN
ENGLAND AND WALES 37 (1832).
1-1 See JUDGMENTS RESTATEMENT, § 68 (1942); Scott, "Collateral Estoppel by
Judgment," 56 HARV. L. REv. l (1942).
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case of wills of personalty and of realty was not as widely divergent as
might be supposed. In each type of will it is assumed that there is no
contest, no adjudication of the due execution of the will, in the ordinary case. Only' when some exceptional circumstance gives rise to a
dispute is there any judicial proceeding in the true sense. In the case
of personalty, it is true, a formal authentication is always given to the
will and title to the personal estate is handed over to the personal representative. In the case of land, the will is accepted at its face value in
the ordinary case, and as vesting title in the devisee without' even a
formal authentication.
The real nature of probate and contest as applied to various kinds
of subject matter is nowhere more clearly brought out than in the
Fourth Report of the Real Property Commissioners of England, made
in 1833.15 "Probate in common form," they asserted, "is in effect a
mere registration of the Will, and we apprehend that there is no
necessity for the machinery of Court to discharge this office of the
present Spiritual Courts, and that every advantage of Probate in common form may be obtained by the establishment of a Register...•"
They then proposed that all wills, whether involving real or personal
property, should be registered; but that probate should be abolished.
In the ordinary case, the registration was to be sufficient. But if a contest was desired, whether involving real or personal estate, then a bill
in equity to establish the will •might be filed, and in this suit an issue
could be directed to a court of law.
As a matter of fact, many of the recommendations of this commission were not adopted. In 1857, however, legislation was enacted
which took away the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts over probate of wills and vested it in a probate court.16 This legislation extended probate to wills involving both real and personal estate. By
subsequent reorganizations of the judiciary, the Probate Division,
which was the successor to the court of probate, became a part of the
High Court of Justice.17 The Land Transfer Act of 1897 18 provided
for the probate of wills involving land only and vested title to the
realty of decedents in the personal representative rather than in the

a

15 FouRTH REPORT BY THE CoMMISSIONERS APPOINTED TO lNQU~RE INTO THE
LAW OF"EN9LAND RESPECTING REAL PROPERTY 55 (1833).
16
20-21 Viet. c. 77, §§3, 4,,p. 240.
11
36-37 Viet. c. 66, p. 191 (1873); 15-16 Geo. 5, c. 49, p. 1197 (1925). For
a brief statement of the present probate jurisdiction in England, see Simes and Basye,
"The Organization of the Probate Court in America," 42 M1cH. L .. REv. 965 at
974-976 (1944).
18
60-61 Viet. c. 65, p. 184.
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heir or devisee. Although probate in common form is still retained
in name, it consists essentially in a registration of the will with the
probate registry and an authentication of it. Probate in solemn form
may be resorted to as in early English law except that such probate
may be had as to wills of real estate as well as of personalty, and the
trial of the issue takes place in the Probate Division.19 It will thus be
seen that Parliament did not adopt the idea of the Real Property
Commissioners of 1833, who wished to unify the law of will contest
by applying the method of contesting wills of land to wills of personalty; instead, the law was unified by applying the method of contesting wills of personalty-namely, probate in solemn form-to wills
of land.

III
CONTEST OF DEVISE OF LAND IN ACTION AT LAW TO TRY TITLE
BECOMES OBSOLETE

Perhaps the first sharp veering away from the English model was
the recognition in America of the jurisdiction of courts of probate and
similar courts to admit to probate wills involving land. Indeed, from
the scanty data which has been examined, one wonders whether in
most of the colonies it was ever supposed that one could not probate
a will involving real estate. Certainly the probate of wills involving
land was usual by the early part of t~e nineteenth century. In Vir- ,ginia a statute enacted in 171 1 20 expressly provided for the probate of
wills involving land. Such wills were subject to probate in North Carolina by legislation enacted in 1784.21 A Connecticut decision 22 holds
that the probate in 1797 of a will involving land was conclusive. A
Pennsylvania case 23 decided in 1791 discusses the effect of the probate
of a will involving land; and a Maryland case 24 decided in 1816 indicates that the probate of wills involving land had long been recognized in that state. One cannot say that the English view, to the effect
that a decree admitting a will to probate was without effect as to realty,
was never followed in this country; for one early New Jersey case 25
19
15-16 Geo. 5, c. 49, §§ 150-175 (1925); TRISTAM AND CooTE, PROBATE
PRACTICE, 18th ed., 389-399 (1940).
20
4 Va. Stat. L. (Hening, 1820) 13.
21
Laws of North Carolina (Iredell, 1791) 528, Acts of Gen. Assembly, 1st. Sess.
1784, c. IO, § 6.
22
Judson v. Lake, 3 Day (Conn.) 318 (1809).
23
Fenn, Lessee of Walmesley v. Read, I Yeates {Pa.) 87 (1791).
24
Massey v. Massey's Lessee, 4 Harr. & Johnson (Md.) 141 (1816).
25
Den d. Thomas v. ~yres, 13 N.J. Law 153 (1832).
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so holds. But it is reason?,bly certain that today in every jurisdiction in
the United States a duly executed testamentary disposition involving
land may be admitted to probate.26
Conceding, however, that in all states today a will involving land
may be admitted to probate, does that exclude the introduction of an
unprobated will in an action in the nature of ejectment or trespass to
try title to lancl? In nearly-all jurisdictions today the answer is clearly
· in the affirmative. There was, however, a period in which there must
have been much uncertainty about the matter. The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts, it is true, in a case decided in 1822,21 held that
the jurisdiction of the probate court to admit to probate a will devising
land is exclusive and unless the will has been so admitted it cannot be
proved in an action to try title. In a note to that decision, moreover,
the reporter refers to another case in which substantially the same thing
had been held some thirty years earlier. But in other jurisdictions it
was held that the decree admitting a will to probate was merely evi26
Statutes expressly require probate of a will of land in Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope,
1937) § 14531; Fla. Stat. Ann. (1941) § 732.26; Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1941)
c. 3, § 20 5; Iowa Code (Reichmann, I 93 9) § l I 8 8 2; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. ( Corrick, Supp. 1943) §59-616; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1944) § 394.130; Me. Rev. Stat. (1944)
c~ 155, § 15; Mass. Ann. Laws (Michie, 1932) c. 191, § 7; Mich. Stat. Ann. (1943)
§ 27.3178(90); Minn. Stat. (1941) §525.222; Neb. Rev. ·stat. (1943) § 30-220;
N.H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 351, § 1; N.C. Gen. Stat. (1943) § 31-39; N.D. Rev.
Code (1943) § 30-0505; Ohio Gen. Code Ann. {Page, 1937) § 10504-29; R.I. Gen.
Laws Ann. (1938) c. 566, § 41; S.C. Code Ann. (1942) § 8964; Vt. Pub. Lawa
(1933) § 2758; Wis. Stat. (1943) § 238.18. There is clear authority to the same
effect in some other states. In the rest the rule is not questioned, but the statutory expression of it is not clear. Such authority as exists is as follows: Inge v. Johnston, l IO
Ala. 650, 20 S; 757 {1895); Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) § 38-202; Cal. Prob. Code
Ann. (Deering, 1944) § 323; Castro v. Richardson, 18 Cal. 478 (1861); Colo. Stat.
Ann. (Michie, 1935) c. 176, §§ 47, 50; Johnes v. Jackson, 67 Conn. 81, 34 A. 709
{1895); Del. Rev. Code (1935) § 3799; D.C. Code (1940) § 11-503; Rogers v.
Rogers, 78 Ga. 688, 3 S.E. 451 (1887); Idaho Laws Ann. (1943) § 15-202; Rogers
v. Stevens, 8 Ind. 464 (1857).; Md. Ann. Code (Flack, 1939) art. 93, § 353; Rothschild v. Hatch, 54 Miss. 554 {1877); Farris v. Burchard, 242 Mo. 1, 145 S.W. 825
(1912); Mont. Rev. Code Ann (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) § 10021; Nev.
Comp. Laws (Supp. 1941) § 9882.06; Moss v. Lane, 50 N.J. Eq. 295, 23 A. 481
(1892); N.M. Stat. Ann. (1941) § 16-410; N.Y. Surr. Ct. Act {Cahill, 1937)
§§ 139, 151; Anderson v. Anderson, II2 N.Y. 104, 19 N.E. 427 (1889); Okla•.
Stat. Ann. (1941) tit. 58, § 22; Jones v. Dove, 6 Ore. 188 {1876); Cochran v.
Young, 104 Pa. 333 (1883); S.D. Code Ann. (1939) § 35.0202; Taylor v. Taylor,
2 Humph. (21 Tenn.) 597 (1841); Lagow v. Glover, 77 Tex. 448, 14 S.W. 141
{1890); Utah Code Ann (1943) § 102-3-2; Va. Code Ann (Michie, 1942) § 5262;
Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932) § 1371; W.Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1943)
§ 4078; Wyo. Rev. Stat. Ann (Courtright, 1931) § 88-210.
27 Shumway v. Holbrook, 1 Pick. (18 Mass.) 114 (1822). And ·see Laughton v.
Atkins, l Pick. (18 Mass.) 535 at 548 (1823).
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dence in an action to try title but was not conclusive; and that, if the
will had not been admitted to probate at all, it could nevertheless be
proved in an action to try title to the land? 8
Doubtless one potent influence in the direction of eliminating proof
of an unprobated will in an action of trespass or ejectment was the decision of Justice Story in Tompkins v. Tompkins 29 in I 841 to the effect
that the statutes of Rhode Island gave the probate court exclusive
jurisdiction to determine the validity of a will involving land and that
its determination could not be attacked collaterally in an action to try
title. Another significant influence in the same direction was the enactment of the following statute as a part of the Massachusetts Revised
Statutes of I 83 6: so
"No will shall be effectual to pass either real or personal estate, unless it shall have been duly proved and allowed in the
probate court; and the probate of a will devising real estate shall
be conclusive as to the due execution of the will, in like manner
as it is of a will of personal estate."
That this was already the common law of Massachuetts is pointed out
in the Revisers' notes as follows: 31
"This is in accordance with the established law in this state;
but as it differs from the law in other places, and is a provision of
very extensive and important influence, it may be useful to insert
it in the text of our statutes."
Today the state of the law is about as follows. 82 In twelve states
statutes similar to the Massachusetts legislation just quoted are in
force, which make it clear that a will involving land must be probated
in order to be admitted to prove a title. In seven other states legislation in a different form undoubtedly has the same effect. Then there
is authority to the effect that, since the probate court has been given
jurisdiction to admit to probate wills involving land, that jurisdiction
28 Jackson ex dem. Le Grange v. Le Grange, 19 Johns. (N.Y.) 386 (1822);
Smith's Lessee v. Steele, I Harr. & McH. (Md.) 419 (1771); Smith v. Bonsall, 5
Rawle (Pa.) 80 (1835); Executors of Crosland v. Murdock, 4 McCord (S. C.) 217
(1827). And see cases cited in 2 GREENLEAF, EvmENcE, 1st ed.,§ 672 (1846).
29
1 Story 547, Fed. Cas. No. 14,091 (1841).
so C. 62, § 32.
81
REPORT OF THE CoMMISSIONERS APPOINTED TO REVISE THE STATUTES Part II,
28 (1834). The statement appears in the note to c. 62, § 20.
82 See note 26, supra. A more cfetailed discussion of these statutes will appear in
Model Probate Code, Appendix A, note to §§ 81 and 85, soon to be published.
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is impliedly exclusive and therefore an unprobated will cannot be
used to prove a title in an action in the nature of trespass or ejectment.88 As the Connecticut court said: 84 "Our statutes commit the probate of all wills to the Courts of Probate; and it has been held in this
State that that court is the only tribunal competent to decide the question of the due execution of a will-including the testamentary capacity
of the testator..•. Hence a party who desires to show title by a will,
to personal property or real estate, can have it received as evidence of
such title, only after it has. been established in th.e proper Court of Probate; because that is the only way in which he can show that the will
under which he claims, is genuine."
In New York it appears that, if the will involving real estate is
admitted to probate, the decree to that effect is conclusive as against
collateral attack. 85 But if it is not offered for probate, then apparently
the unprobated will may be proved in an action to try title to the land
involved.86 The same also appears to be the rule in Virginia.87 In
Tennessee there is a line of authority indicating that a will involving
larid cannot be proved until it is admitted to probate; 88 there are, however, indications in the statutes and cases 89 that under some circumstances, at least, an unprobated will may be proved in an action to try
title and that a decree admitting a will to probate may be attacked collaterally in such an action. It should be pointed out that in New York'0
and Virginia,41 and perhaps elsewhere, an unprobated will involving
land is not entitled to be recorded. Therefore, the contest of a will in
those jurisdictions in an action in the nature of ejectment would seem
to have small practical value, and is probably a little used device.
It thus appears that the contest of a will, in an action to try title to
land, is, for most practical purposes, obsolete in the United States. The
remainder of the discussion proceeds upon this assumption.
88 See Swazey's Heirs v. Blackman, 8 Ohio 5 (1837); Jones v. Dove, 6 Ore. 188
(1876); Cummins v. Cummins, I Marvel (15 Del.) 423 at 440, 31 A. 816 (1895).
In general, see cases cited in note in Ann. Cas. I 9 I 6 A 8 8 7.
84
Johnes v. Jackson, 67 Conn. 81 at 90, 34.A. 709 (1895). The same view is
well expressed in Castro v. Richardson, 18 Cal. 478 (1861).
85
,
See N.Y. Surr. Ct. Act (Cahill, Supp. 1945) § So.
86 Corley v. McElmeel, 149 N.Y. 228, 43 N.E. 628 (1896).
87 Bagwell v. Elliott, 2 Rand. (23 Va.) 190 (1824).
88 Taylor v. Taylor, 2 Humph. (21 T~nn.) 597 (1841); Weaver v. Hughes, 26
Tenn. App. 436 at 443, 173 S.W. (2d) 159 (1943).
89 Weatherhead v. Sewell, 9 Humph. (28 Tenn.) 272 (1848); Tenn. Code Ann.
(Michie, 1938) § 8127.
40
•
N.Y. Surr. Ct. Act (Cahill, 1937) § 152.
41
Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1942) § 526l
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IV
TYPES OF WILL CONTESTS DEVELOPED IN THE UNITED STATES

So far the evolution of Anglo-American law of will contest is all
to the credit of the American states. There was no good reason why a
will of land should not be probated once and for all just as a will of
personalty. If it was desirable to have the matter settled finally as to
the personal property, it was even more desirable to have a final determination as to real estate. Thus, our legislatures and courts determined
that a will involving land must be probated; and they reached this
rational conclusion decades before the same reform took place in England.42 ·
But here our favorable balance in the ledger of history ends. As
will appear more fully in the survey of legislation which follows, in a
large number of states the rational basis of the will contest was entirely
overlooked; and the modification of the English system which took
place left us with a totally anomalous legal device.
Before embarking upon a survey of American statutes, however, it
may be pointed out that the first step in classifying the various jurisdictions is to divide them on the basis of the presence or absence of
notice for the initial probate. If notice is not required and is not given
for the initial probate, there will necess~rily be a basis for contest after
probate and we shall always find it. On the other hand, if notice is
required for the initial probate, either there is no reason for contest
after probate or the reason must be entirely different from that which
justifies the contest after probate in the other group of states. But
whether the initial probate pro·ceeding is begun with or without notice,
contest after probate, if it exists at all, follows one of _three patterns:
(I) the hearing is like probate in solemn form in that it is before the
same tribunal which admitted the will to probate; (2) the hearing is
in a higher tribunal, usually chancery or the trial court of general
jurisdiction, and bears a superficial resemblance to a trial of the issue
devisavit vel non as directed by English chance;ry; 43 and (3) though
the statutes in terms provide only for contest before probate, an appeal
with trial de novo to the trial court of general jurisdiction has the effect of a will contest. As we shall see, the provisions for will contests
42 Wills of land were not subject to probate in England until legislation enacted in
18 57 so provided. See note 16, supra.
·
48
But the proceeding in this country, unlike the English prototype, is in rem
and does not concern any particular land or other estate. This will be apparent from
the discussion of the law of particular jurisdictions which follows.
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in the respective states 44 involve almost every conceivable combination of the various patterns and bases for classification which have been
suggested.
·
Taking up first the jurisdictions in which probate may be initiated
without notice, we find two groups of states: ( r) those which follow
the pattern of the English probate in common and in solemn form;
and ( 2) those which provide for a contest in a higher tribunal than
that in which the will was probated. This classification is further complicated by the fact that an appeal with trial de novo is permitted in
some of them but not in others, and that, in at least one of them; no
contest before probate is permitted.
Second, we shall consider those jurisdictions in which notice is required for the initial probate. We shall see that a very few of them
permit contest only before probate; others provide expressly for contest both before and after probate in the same court; still others provide for contest after probate in a higher tribunal than that in which
the will was probated; and a very considerable number, while professing to permit contest only before probate, in fact permit a contest after
probate in the guise of an appeal with trial de novo in the trial court of
general jurisdiction. The picture is further complicated by the fact
that, in a few states in which probate is always preceded by notice, a
will contest can take place only ~fter probate.

A. Jurisdictions Permitting Probate without Notice
r. Common and solemn form probate in same coiwt
In the following states, the English system of common and solemn
form probate is rather closely followed: Delaware,45 Florida,46 Geor44

In this survey, the law of Louisiana is excluded, since it is of civil law origin.
Del. Rev. Code (1935) §§ 3799 to 3802. The statutes are contained in a
chapter on "Settlement of Personal Estates" but would seem to apply to wills involving land since § 3799 provides that the record of the probated will "shall be sufficient
evidence in respect to both real and personal estate." Proof may be taken without notice, or notice to interested parties may be given on request. § 3800 provides for a
caveat at any time before probate. § 3801 gives a right of review to "any person interested who shall not voluntarily appear at the time of taking the proof of a will, or be
served with citation or notice as provided in Section [ 3799] ."
46 Fla. Stat. Ann. (1941) §§ 732.23 to 732.31. Probate is in the county judge's
court. This may be without notice, § 732.23, or apparently may be initiated with
notice. § 732.30. After probate "any interested party'' may have notice given,
§ 732.28. An heir or distributee may .file a caveat, whereupon he is given notice.
§ 732.29. Any heir or distributee, "except those who have been served with citation
before probate or who are barred under 732.29" may petition for revocation of probate. § 732.30.
45
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gia,47 Indiana,48 Maryland,49 Mississippi,5° New Ham.pshire,51 North
Carolina 52 and South Carolina. 58 In general, this means that the original probate may be without notice, or, if something in the nature of a
caveat is :filed, it is with notice. If the original probate is without notice,
then there may be a contest thereafter on notice to interested parties.
To this group of states we may add, also, Oregon 54 and Washington,55
although it is not entirely clear in those states whether the original
probate can be contested, or whether there must first be a probate
without notice, followed by a contest with notice.5 6 This, on the whole,
would seem to be a perfectly rational scheme; but it should be noted
that legislation in at least three of these jurisdictions,57 namely Georgia,
New Hampshire, and Oregon, permits a trial de novo on an appeal to
the trial court of general jurisdiction;
The following quotation is made from the Georgia legislation, by
way of illustrating the kind of statute here considered: 58

"II3-6or. Probate of a will may be either in common or
solemn form. In the former case, upon the testimony of a single
subscribing witness, and without notice to anyone, the will may be
proved and admitted to record. Such probate and record is not
conclusive upon anyone interested in the estate adversely to the
will •..."
47

Ga. Code Ann. (Park, 1936) §§ 113-601 to 113-618.
Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933 and Supp. 1943) §§ 7-501 to 7-508, 7-5II,
7-513. Contest may be in the circuit court, either before or after probate.
49
Md. Ann. Code (Flack, 1939) art. 93, §§ 353, 357 to 363, for probate and
contest in the orphans' courts. But see § 370 as to an issue "deoisaoit oel non sent from
a court of equity."
50
Miss. Code Ann. ( I 942) §§ 503 to 508. Probate and contest are in equity,
§ 495. But the general plan is that of probate in common or solemn form.
51
N.H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 351, §§ 6 to 9·
52
N.C. Gen. Stat. (1943) §§ 31-32 to 31-37. Probate in common form takes
place before the clerk of the superior court. Probate in solemn form is in the superior
court.
53
S.C. Code Ann (1942) §§ 8932 to 8934.
H Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) § 19-202 to 19-204, 19-208 (amended Laws
1945, c. 185).
55
Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932) §§ 1385 to 1389.
56
The statutes and cases do not make the point entirely clear, but see 1 BANCROFT'S PROBATE PRACTICE,§ 109 and note 3 (1928).
57 Ga. Code Ann. (Park, 1936) § 6-501; N.H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 365, § II;
Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. ( 1940) § 10-8 IO. And see, in general, Simes and Basye, "The
Organization of the Probate Court in America," 42 M1cH. L. REv. 965 at 995,
footnotes 151 and 152 (1944). It is possible, also, that appeal with trial de novo may be
had in South Carolina. See S. C. Code Ann. (1942) §§ 231 and 233; Muldrow v.
Jeffords, 144 S.C. 509, 142 S. E. 602 (1927); Ex parte White, 33 S.C. 442, 12 S.E.
5 (1890).
118
See note 47, supra.
48
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"rr3-602 .. Probate by the witnesses, .or probate in solemn
form, is the proving of the will, after due notice to all the heirs at
law, by all the witnesses in life and within the jurisdiction of the
court, or by pi;-oof of their signatures and that of the testator, if
the witnesses are dead or inaccessible; and the ordering to record
of the wiµ so proved. Such probate is conclusive upon all the
parties notified, and all the legatees under the will who are represented in the ~xecutor."
"rr3-605. Probate in common form shall become conclusive
upon all parties at interest after the expiration of seven years from
the time of such probate, except minor heirs at law who require
proof in solemn form and interpose a caveat within four years
after arrival at age. . . ."
While there is much variation in the respective statutes referred
to, they all appear to prescribe this same general type of contest.
It would seem also that Arkansas 59 now should belong to this
group.of states, since both probate and contest are in chancery. However, its legislation has developed from a type of will contest similar
to that described in the next subdivision.
2.

Contest in a higher court after probate

Much greater variation is found in the legislation involved in the
seven states which may fairly be classed in this group than in the group
just discussed. Hence, the states will be considered one by one. In the
. 59

The compilation of Arkansas statutes of 1937 includes provisions for probate
and contest resembling the English probate in solemn and in common form. Ark.
Dig. Stat. (Pope, 1937) §§ 14540 to 14544. The court of probate was empowered to
grant probate in solemn form without notice. Or probate coulcl take place on previous
notice. An appeal to the circuit court with trial de novo was recognized. Ark. Dig.
Stat. (Pope, 1937) §§ 14530, 14543. Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope, 1937) § 14545 provided that certain persons might "within three years after such final decision in the
circuit court, by a bill in chancery, impeach the decision and have a retrial of the question of probate .•••" In 1939 a constitutional provision and certain legislation vested
probate jurisdiction in the court of chancery. Ark. Const., Amend. 24; Ark. Acts,
1939, act 3, p. 6. It has been said, however, that this change did not completely consolidate the two courts, but provided for "probate courts in chancery." Lewis v.
Smith, 198 Ark. 244 at 248, 129 S.W. (2d) 229 (1939). The appeal to the circuit
court with trial de novo appears to have been taken away. Ark. Acts, 1939, act 214,
p. 526. By Ark. Acts, 1941, act 401, p. l 169, it was provided:
"That in any case where a will has been admitted to probate without notice having previously been given to the heirs of the deceased testator, a contest of the probation
or legality of such will may be heard by the court probating the same. Any heir of
the deceased testator may, within six months after the probation of such will, but not
thereafter, file a complaint in said court setting out the grounds upon which the legality
of such will is contested. . . ."
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case of Virginia, the history of will contests in that state will be outlined, partly because it is typical of the sort of evolution which has
taken place in other states, and partly because the Virginia legislation
furnished the model for other jurisdictions.
(a) Virginia. Although a brief statute enacted in 1645 gave the
county courts jurisdiction to probate wills of residents,6° the :first legislation in Virginia dealing with will contests was enacted in 171 I.6 1. It
provided for the probate of wills of land as well as of personalty. If a
will involved land, the heir was to be summoned to appear at the proving of the will "to show forth anything that shall or may be lawfully
alledged against such proof...•" There was also a saving clause allowing to persons under disability ten years after their disabilities were
removed in which they might contest the probate of the will.
In 1744 additional legislation was enacted 62 for the reason that, as
stated in its preamble, "the proof of wills in the general court, or county courts of this colony, where lands are devised away from the heir
or heirs at law of the decedent, is attended with inconveniences to the
executors, and losses in the personal estate." This enactment provided
as follows:
"That from and after the passing of this act, when any wills
are exhibited to be proved in the general court, or any county court
of this dominion, it shall and may be lawful to and for the said
courts, to proceed immediately to receive the proof of such wills;
and to appoint appraisers to value the slaves and personal estate
of such testator.
"Provided always, That where the lands of such testator, or any
part thereof, shall, by such wills, be devised away from the heir or
heirs at law, such proof as to him, her, or them, shall not be binding; but such heir or heirs shall be summoned, in the manner directed by law, and shall and may be at liberty to contest the
validity of such will, in the same manner as if this act had never
been made."
In 1748 this legislation was amended 68 by adding a provision extending the time to contest in case of disabilities. The amendment also
made it reasonably clear that the notice to the heirs in the case of a will
involving land might take place after probate. After the clause to the
effoct that the will shall not be binding as to the heir, the amendment
00

1 Va. Stat. L. (Hening, 1809) 302.
4 Va. Stat. L. (Hening, 1820) 12.
62
5 Va. Stat. L. (Hening, 1819) 231.
68
5 Va. Stat. L. (Hening, 1819) 454.
5 1.
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continued "but the court'shall cause such heir or heirs to be summoned,
to appear at the next court, and to contest the validity of such will, ..•
and if no heir be known ... then proclamation of such will, being exhibited and proved, shall be made by the sheriff ... and he shall also
publish notice thereof, in writing, and all persons concerned in interest,
who at the time of proving any will, shall be under the age of one and
twenty years, feme covert, non compos mentis, imprisoned, or out of
this colony, shall have liberty to contest the proof thereof, within ten
years after their several disabilities and incapacities removed, and not
afterwards."
Thus, it would seem that notice before probate, which was required
as to wills of land in the legislation of r 7 r r, had not proved satisfactory, and that apparently later amendments permitted a return to
the old system of probate without notice.
_ However, the legislation which was to be the basis of all subsequent
will contest statutes in Virginia was enacted in 1785. The important
provisions of it are as follows: 6 ,1,
"XL When any will shall be exhibited to be proved, the court
having jurisdiction as aforesaid, may proceed immediately to receive the proof thereof, and grant a certificate of such probat: If
however, any person interested, shall within seven years afterwards appear, and by his bill in chancery contest the validity of
the will, an issue shall be made up, whether the writing produced
be the will of the testator ·or not, which shall be tried by a jury,
whose verdict shall be final between the parties; saving to the
court a power of granting a new trial for good cause, as in other
trials; but no such party appearing within that time, the probat
shall be forever binding.
"XII. In all such trials by jury, the certificate of the oath of
the witnesses, at the time of the first probat, shall be admitted as
evidence, to have such weight as the jury shall think it deserves."
The significance of this legislation is aptly expressed by the court
in Coalter's Executor v. Bryan,65 as follows:
"The obvious purpose of these provisions is, r. To recognize
the ex parte probat of wills, both of realty and personalty; 2. To
extend the privilege of requiring a reprobat, so as to embrace
both; 3. To prescribe a period of limitation for such reprobat;
4. To change the citation for reprobat, so as to require it to be of
those interested in sustaining the will, instead of those interested
64
65

12 Va. Stat. L. (Hening, 1823) 142.
l Gratt. (42 Va.) 18 at 79 (1844).
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in opposing it; 5. To shift the final probat from the court of original probat to the court of chancery, to be there exercised by the
instrumentality of a jury; 6. To provide against the loss of testimony in support of the will, which might result from the delay of
the final probat, by authorizing, for the consideration of the jury,
documentary evid~nce of the proof at the first probat."
Without attempt~ng to list all the statutory modifications made
from time to time in this legislation, the following important changes
may be noted. In 18 3 8 66 a provision was inserted by which the proponent of a will could institute the proceeding for probate with notice
to interested parties if he so desired. But the provisions for probate
without notice and a trying of the issue of will or no will in chancery
were retained, and all are embodied in the Code of 1849.6 ' The 1849
Code permits a devise; to contest a finding adverse to the will, 68 just
as an heir could contest a finding in favor of the will.
The present legislation in Virginia on will contests may be summarized as follows: 69
Probate jurisdiction is vested in circuit and corporation courts and
in various clerks of court and their deputies. The probate of a will may
be instituted either with or without notice. If the will is admitted by a
clerk, any person interested may have an appeal as of right within six
months in the same court. The appeal is to be heard by the court "as
though it had been presented to the said court in the first instance."
Where the original probate is by the court there is no trial de novo on
appeal. The court or any person interested in the probate of the will,
"may cause interested persons to be summoned; and notice of the hearing as to probate may be given by publication. In such a proceeding
the final order "shall be a bar to a bill in equity to impeach or establish such will, unless on such ground as would give to a court of equity
jurisdiction over other judgments at law." It is also provided that any
court having jurisdiction to probate wills may proceed to establish a
will ex parte and without notice. In such a proceeding, or on an appeal
with trial de novo from a decision of a clerk, a person not a party to the
original proceeding may proceed by bill in equity to impeach or establish the will. On this bill, a trial by jury is to be ordered to ascertain
"whether any, and if any, how much of what was so offered for pro66

Va. Acts 1838, c. 92, p. 71.
Va. Code (1849) c. 122, §§ 29-36.
68
Formerly the law was otherwise but the 1849 Code corrected this discrepancy.
See REPORT OF REVISERS OF VIRGINIA CoDE 632 (1849).
69
Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1942) §§ 5247, 5249, 5253 to 5261.
67
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bate, be the wiil of the decedent." Only one year in which to contest
by bill in equity is allowed, subject to exceptions as to persons under
disability and others similarly situated.
It will thus be seen that Virginia has worked out a perfectly rational
system of will contest. If the original probate is before the court, no
one can contest after probate unless he was not a party to the original
proceeding. Contest after probate is ordinarily by bill in equity and
thus resembles slightly the practice of English equity of framing the
issue of will or no will. Only in the case of the probate before the clerk
can the same parties have the issue tried de novo, and this is obviously
because of the inferior judicial qualifications of the clerk.
(b) West Virginia. When West Virginia separated from Virginia
during the war between the states, it took ovei: pretty largely the Virginia legal system. Since that time, however, modifications have been
made in the provisions for will contest, but the resemblance to the
parent statutes is very substantial.
The present legislation 70 provides for either an ex parte probate or
a probate in solemn form in the county court. A contest before probate
may be had in connection with -the probate in solemn form if interested
parties take the proper steps. The judgment of the county court may
be appealed to the circuit court and the issue is then tried de novo. The
code also provides for a contest in chancery in the circuit court. A person who is regarded as a party to a probate in solemn form not appealed
from or to an appeal with trial de novo in the circuit court· cannot contest in chancery. Indeed, it would seem that the contest in chancery is
only possible if the prior probate has been ex parte or if the contestant
was omitted as a party to a probate in solemn form or to an appeal in
the circuit court.
From this brief summary it i's apparent that West Virginia, by making· a much greater use of the appeal with trial de novo than does
Virginia, permits in the ordinary case two trials of the issue, will or no
will, after due notice to interested parties.
(c) Kentucky. Kentucky legislation on will contest,71 wliich appears to stem from the Virginia legislation of 1785,72 presents substantially the same set-up as that of West Virginia. Wills may be probated in the county court, with or without notice to interested parties.
There may be a contest before probate in the county court. The judgW. Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1943) §§ 4061-4072.
Ky. Rev. Stat. (1944) §§ 394.170 to 394.280.
.
72 See Case of Wells's Will, 5 Littell (16 Ky.) 273 (1824); Dibble v. Winter,
247 Ill. 243 at 257, 93 N.E. 145 (1916).
70

71

w ILL
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ment of the county court may be appealed to the circuit court with a
trial de novo. It is further provided that "Any person interested who,
at the time of the final decision in the circuit court, resided out of this
state and was proceeded against by warning order only, without actual
. appearance or being personally served with process, and any other
person interested who was not a party to the proceeding by actual appearance or being personally served with process, may •.• by petition in '
equity, impeach the decision and have a retrial of the question of
probate...." 18
(d) Pennsylvania. An ex parte probate may be had before the
register. 74 A caveat may be filed prior to probate, upon which the register may "issue a precept to either the court of common pleas or the orphans' court" directing a trial of the issue of will or no will.75 An appeal with trial de novo may be taken, from the registrar to the orphans'
court, or on the filing of a caveat prior to probate, the registrar may
certify the record to the orphans' court.16
( e) Tennessee. Probate is in the county court if t;here is no contest.11 If the will is contested before probate, the case is transferred to
the circuit court and there tried. 78 Presumably an appeal from the decision of the county court with trial de novo in the circuit court would
be possible. 79
(f) New Jersey. The complicated probate court organization has
been described in another monograph. 80 It is sufficient to state here the
important provisions as to contest. 81 Either the surrogate or the prerogative court has original jurisdiction to probate wills. If a caveat is ·
filed when the will is before the surrogate, the proceeding is removed
to the orphans' court. An appeal may also be taken to the orphans'
court from the proceeding before a surrogate respecting the probate of
a will. In either case, the issue is tried de novo, the orphans' court,
however, having the power to certify the question of fact to the circuit
court for a trial of the issue.
18

Ky. Rev. Stat. (1944) § 394.280.
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 20, § 1861. See, also, 2 HUNTER, PENNSYLVANIA ORPHANS' CouRT COMMONPLACE Boox u22 (1939); REMICK, PENNSYLVANIA ORPHANS' CouRT PRACTICE, 2d ed., §§ 15, 23 (1932).
15
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1944) tit. 20, § 1961.
16
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 20, §§ 1981, 1982, 2005, 2006.
11
Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1938) §§ 8099, 8102.
18
Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1938) §§ 8103-8n2.
79
Tenn. Code Ann (Michie, 1938) §§ 9028, 9033.
so Simes and Basye, "The Organization of the Probate Court in America," 42
MICH. L. REv. 965 at 982 (1944).
81
N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) 3:2-20 to 3:2-36.
14
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(g) Missouri. Probate must be in the probate court. 82 There can
be no contest until after probate; then the contest takes place in the
circuit court. 83

B. Jurisdictions Requiring Notice Before Probate
For some reason which is not entirely clear at the present time a
large number of jurisdictions at an early period abandoned the English
plan of an ex parte probate in common form without notice. It may
have been because the probate of wills disposing of land was included
in the court's jurisdiction, and traditionally the validity of a devise of
land had been tested by an action at law which began with notice to the
defendant. Or it may have been merely that the American conception
of procedure involved the· tacit assumption that no valid proceeding
could be instituted without prior notice to interested parties. At any
rate it has come about that slightly over half the states require some
sort of notice before a will can be probated. 84 It is believed that in many
instances this change has taken place without a full realization of its
relation to legislation permitting contest after probate. In the discussion which follows, the statutes will be summarized with this in mind.
We shall begin with New York and shall include a little of the history
of its legislation, since the statutes of no other state, unless it be California, have had so much influence in shaping present day will contest
legislation.
r. Contest only before probate
In two jurisdictions, New York and Massachusetts, the only contest of a will, in the sense herein described, takes place before probate.
That is to say, will contest is like any other issue in any trial court; the
issue must be made up before trial; thereafter, the remedy is by appeal
or, in very extraordinary situations, by some special proceeding to reopen the judgment or decree. As will be pointed out later, the same
can be said of a will contest in the more populous areas of Wisconsin;
but, since the rule is otherwise in other courts of that state, its provisions
for will contest will be considered in another connection.
(a) New York. While probate and contest had a long prior history
in New York,85 the significant elements of the narrative begin with the
Revised Statutes of 1828. Prior to that legislation the English system
Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1942) § 529. Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1942 and Supp. 1945) §§ 538 to 541.
84
See 43 MICH. L. REv. II53 (1945).
85 See Matter of Brick's Estate, 15 Abb. Pr. (N.Y.) 12 (1862); REDFIELD, LAW
AND PRACTICE OF SURROGATES' CoURTS, 2d ed., 1-18 (1881).
82
83

·
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of probate in common and in solemn form was in force. 86 By the Revised Statutes of r828 separate provisions were made for the probate
of wills of real and of personal property. In the probate of each kind
of will, however, notice prior to the hearing was required. In the case
of the will involving real property, the heirs were to be notified; 87 in
the case of personalty, the widow and next of kin. 88
The article on probate of wills of personal property also contained
this provision: 89
"Notwithstanding a will of personal property may have been admitted to probate, any of the next of kin of the testator, may, at any
time within one year after such probate, contest the same, or the validity of such will, in the manner herein provided." The code then
continued with several sections outlining the procedure for will contest.
There was no analogous provision for the contest of the probate of a
will involving real property. Presumably this was because _such probate was not conclusive as to the due execution of the will. The revisers' notes give the following explanation for the provision concerning will contest: 90
"The preceding sections, from section 32 inclusive, are new;
they are prepared in order to provide for a case which may often
occur, and for which it is at least questionable whether there is any
provision by the existing law. The notice previous to proving a
will is necessarily short, and must often be inadequate to apprise
all of the parties interested, and yet it would seem that when once
admitted to proof, the probate is perfectly conclusive; vide Phillip's Evidence, r vol. p. 245. In England, a practice prevails in the
ecclesiastical courts, of permitting a second and more solemn
proof, by the citation of the parties at the instance of a relative.
Vide 2 Phillimore, 224. But there it has the effect of suspending
all the proceedings of the executors; a result much to be deprecated. We have adopted that practice, with many modifications,
fitted to our situation, and we propose to limit the time for reexamination, so as not to interfere with the payment of legacies,
which cannot be required until one year after probate. In the case
of a will of real estate, the proof is not so conclusive as of personal property, but the heir may contest it in a suit at law. The
reason would seem equally to apply to a will of personal estate,
86

REDFIELD, LAw AND PRACTICE OF SuRROGATEs' CouRTS, 2d. ed. 256 (1881).
2 N.Y. Rev. Stat. (1829) Part 2, c. 6, tit. 1, art. 1, §§ 8 and 9 at p. 57.
88
2 N.Y. Rev. Stat. (1829) Part 2, c. 6, tit. 1, art. 2, § 24, at p. 60.
89
2 N.Y. Rev. Stat. (1829) Part 2, c. 6, tit. 1, art. 2, § 30, at p. 61.
00
3 N.Y. Rev. Stat. (2d ed., 1836) p. 630, "Original note on § 32 to 48," in
which this statement appears.
87
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so far as to provide some summary mode, by which he may contest it;"
,
·
It is thus apparent that the New Yark legislation, by requiring
notice prior to a hearing on.probate of the will, and permitting a contest after probate, had in effect provided for two probates in solemn
form.
In Collier v. Jdley's Executors/ 1 Surrogate Bradford explains this
anomaly by saying that the original plan was to permit only next of
'kin who were out of the jurisdiction, and therefore not personally
served, to contest after probate; but that the legislature broadened the
contest provision so as to niake it available to all interested parties. His
language is as follows:
"Though the practice of proving wills in common form has
, prevailed in other portions of the United States, and though it was
customary in the State of New York, previous to the revision of
the statutes, to prove wills of personalty in that manner, still, it
was not usual to require a new proof of the will in solemn form,
on the demand of the next of kin. And yet the probate was conclusive. To remedy this difficulty, the first step was to provide for
notice to the next of kin on the original proof of the will (2 R.S.,
p. 60, § 24.) ... Still, personal service of the citation was requisite, only on those who could be served in the county of the Surrogate, ?,nd next of kin not personally served, might be cut off by
constructive notice by advertisement. To meet this case, the Revisers reported to the Legislature a series of provisions, designed
to allow proof of the"will in solemn form at the call of any of the
next of kin, upon whom a citation to attend the probate had not ,
been personally served. (S~e Original Section, § 36.) .•• It is
evident that the statute, as reported to the Legislature was an
adoption of the system of proof in Solemn Form, in the case of
such of the next of kin as had not been cited. .. . . But the Legislature determined to make the statute much broader, and while they
retained all the features of the English practice, as reported by the
Revisers, they extended the benefit of the statute to all the next of
kin, whether they had been regularly cited on the original probate or not, the clause limiting the right to file allegations to those
who had not bee?). personally cited, being stricken out, and the section enacted as it now stands."
While there were some amendments,92 this general type of will
91

92

I Bradf. Surr. 94 (1849).
·
In I 8 37 the separate provisions for notice of probate of a will of real and of

personal property were repealed, and a group of sections covering notice for both types
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contest was retained until after the tu~ of the century. In r900 the
New York Commissioners of Statutory Revision, in their report of that
year on "General Procedure," recommended, not an elimination of the
requirement of notice for the initiation of a probate proceeding, but
the repeal of the provisions permitting contest after probate. Their
reasons are expressed in the following words: 98
"The commissioners think that the unreversed decree of the
surrogate ~dmitting a will to probate should be conclusive everywhere until modified, or reversed on appeal. We think the general rule should apply here as in other cases, namely, to furnish
a tribunal in which one trial of the issues involved in a probate
proceeding may be had, and that the suitors or persons interested
should not be given two tribunals with alternative or cumulative
jurisdiction; that is, suitors should not be permitted to use one
court, and if dissatisfied or if they neglect their rights in that tribunal, go into another tribunal and try the same issues which were
or mig.p.t have been tried in the first ...•
"Under the plan proposed any contestant may if he wishes
submit the issues to the surrogate, or if he prefers, he may have
the issues tried by a jury; and we think that when the issues are so
tried and finally determined and settled, the adjudication should
be final and conclusive; and there should not be any other opportunity to try the same issues, unless a new trial is ordered .•••
"The will once admitted to probate under the plan suggested
ought to be conclusive, and the estate ought not to be subjected
to the uncertainty of a possible application for revocation. Ample
provision is made for obtaining a new trial."
In spite of this forceful argument against the double trial of the
issue of will or no will, it was not until the legislative session of r9r4
that all provisions for contest after probate were repealed. 94 While an
appeal from the decree was allowed, and the introduction of new evidence was permissible, it was in the nature of an equity appeal and not
a trial of the issues de novo.95
of wills was substituted. See N.Y. Laws 1837, c. 460. In general as to will contest in
1881, see REDFIELD, LAw AND PRACTICE OF SURROGATES' CoURTS, 2d ed., c, 8
(1881). In 1892 a provision for contest in the Supreme Court after probate of a will
of real or personal property was enacted. N.Y. Laws 1892, c. 591. See this section, as
amended in N.Y. Code of Civ. Proc. (Parker, 3d ed., 1903) § 2653a. Provisions for
a contest after probate in the Surrogates' Court were repealed by N.Y. Laws 1910, c.
578.
98
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS OF STATUTORY REVISION OF NEW
YORK 216 (1900).
94
N.Y. Laws 1914, c. 443. See particularly § 2617 thereof.
.
95
See JESSUP-REDFIELD, LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE SURROGATES' CouRTS
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Under the present New York legislation,96 the will can be contested
at or before the close of testimony taken on behalf of the proponent, but
apparently not later than that time. The original proceeding is always
initiated with notice. A decree does not affect the right or interest of a
person not notified as provided in the code.
It thus appears that New York eventually arrived at quite as rational a system of will contest as Virginia, whose history we have
previously examined on this point, but of a very different sort. Briefly
stated, it is this: the requirement of notice before probate is imposed;
but there can be no contest after probate. Therefore, the trial of the
issue of will or no will can only occur once.
(b) Massachusetts. The story of the development of the Massachusetts probate system has been so well presented by Professor Atkinson 97 that little need be added here. Although the statutes are not explicit, it appears that the practice in Massachusetts is to give notice of
the proceeding to probate a will when the petition is filed. 98 It has,
doubtless, long been the rule that contest takes place before probate. 99
But prior to I 920, there was an appeal from the decision of the probate
court which constituted a trial de novo before a single justice of the
Supreme Judicial Court. 100 At the present time, however, appeals from
the decision of the probate court probating or rejecting a will are heard
as equity appeals before the Supreme Judicial Court.101 It is true, the
probate court may have the issue of will or no will tried before a jury
in the superior court, but this appears to be merely because it is inconvenient for the probate court to call a jury and not because the case is
being transferred to a higher court. 102
2.

Contest before and after probate in same court

In a very considerable number of states, the legislatures appear to
have modified the old procedure for probate in common and solemn
§ 189 (1925); Taft, "Comments on Will Contest in New York," 30 YALE L. J. 593
at 601 (1921).
96
N.Y. Surr. Ct. Act§§ 141, 147-149.
97
Atkinson, "The Development of the Massachusetts Probate System," 42 MICH.
L. REv. 425 (1943).
98
See NEWHALL, SETTLEMENT OF EsTATEs, 3d ed., § 28 (1937); MoTTLA,
MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE § 3 l ( l 942).
99
See NEWHALL, SETTLEMENT OF EsTATEs, 3d ed., § 30 (1937), and cases
therein cited; Mass. Rev. Stat. (1836) c. 83, § 47.
100
See Mass. Rev. Laws (1902) c. 162, § 25.
101
Mass Ann. Laws (1932) c. 215, § 9 and following. See Mass. Gen. Acts,
1919, c. 274.
102
Mass. Ann. Laws (1932) c. 215, § 16.
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form by requiring notice to interested parties before any probate at all.
Thus, the principal reason for contest after probate under the English
system,-namely that interested parties had no notice of the :first probate,-is gone. And it is not easy to :find a satisfactory reason for the
retention of the contest after probate.
(a) The California group. The states whose legislation on will
contest presents the greatest amount of similarity are those which follow the pattern found in California. Without doubt this was influenced
by some stage of development of the New York legislation already
described, yet it presents a form and content all its own. The legislation of eleven states may fairly be classed in this group, namely: Arizona, California, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming. As legislation in
three of these, North and South Dakota and Oklahoma, presents certain common characteristics, their statutes will be discussed together
after the others are considered.
(b) California. In I 850, the year in which California became a
state, its legislature passed "An Act to regulate the Settlement of the
Estates of Deceased Persons." 103 This legislation constitutes the beginning of the present California law of will contest. Prior to that time
the Mexican law of wills and administration was in force. 104 This act
consisted of fourteen chapters, the second of which was entitled "Of
the Proof of Wills." Important features of this chapter, for our purpose, are as follows: no distinction is made between wills of real and of
personal property; notice by publication, and by citation, prior to the
hearing on the probate of a will, was provided for; 105 the will could be
contested before probate by :filing written grounds of opposition.1°6
Without doubt the legislation was influenced by that in force in New
York. This is particularly indicated by the section dealing with contest
after probate, which is as follows: 101 "When a will has been admitted
to probate, any person interested may, at any time within one year after
such probate, contest the same, or the validity of the will. For that purpose he shall :file in the Court before which the will was proved, a petition in writing, containing his allegations against the validity of the
will, or against the sufficiency of the proof, and praying that the probate may be revoked."
A revised "Act to Regulate the Settlement of the Estates of DeCal. Stat. 1850, c. 129.
Castro v. Castro, 6 Cal. l 58 ( l 8 56); Coppinger v. Rice, 33 Cal. 408 ( I 867).
105
Cal. Stat. 1850, c. 129, §§ 13-15.
10
°Cal. Stat. 18 50, c. 129, § 20.
101 Cal . Stat.
' 1850, c. 129, § 30.

103
104
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ceased Persons" was passed in l 85 l ' 108 but, so far as the law of will
contest is concerned, its changes were not significant. An amendment
in 18 55 ~09 provided for a jury trial of will contests.
The California Code of Civil Procedure of 1872, still following, in
general, the scheme of the enactment of 1850 as to will contests, presents elaborate provisions for contest before probate in a separate article.110 The contestant is specifically declared to.be the plaintiff and the
petitioner the defendant.111 The petitioner may demur or answer and
issues of fact which may be raised are stated. Another article of seven
sections 112 entitled "Contesting Will After Probate" is chiefly a rearrangement of materials contained in the act of 1851.
In 1929,113 the provision permitting any interested person to contest after probate was changed so that such a contest could be instituted
only by "any interested person, other than a party to a contest filed
before probate pursuant to section 1312 of this code and other than a
person who had actual notice of contest thereunder in time to have
joined therein." The period for contest after probate was, by the same
act, reduced from one year to six months.
In 1931 the provisions for will contest appear as a part of a Probate
Code in a chapter entitled "Contests of, Wills," 114 consisting of two
articles, one on "Contests before Probate" and one on "Contests after
Probate." This chapter has remained practically unchanged since that
time.115

.

At the present time, as in prior legislation, two will contests are
possible, although·the·first as well as the second is instituted with notice.
But this anomaly is mitigated to a large extent by the provision enacted
in 1929 denying a second contest to those who were parties to the first
contest or who liad actual notice in time to participate. The most significant sections of the present legislation on will contest, for the purposes
of this discussion, are as follows: 116
"Sec. 3 70. Any person interested may contest the will by filing
written grounds of opposition to the probate thereof at any time
before the hearing of the petition for probate, and thereupon a
citation shall be issued directed to the heirs of the decedent and to
108 Cal. Stat. 1851, c. 124.
109 Cal. Stat. 1855, c. no.
11°Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (1872) §§ 1312 to 1318.
111

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (1872) § 1312.

112 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (1872) §§ 1327-1333.
118

Cal. Stat. 1929, c. 495.
Cal.,Probate Code (Deering, 1931) Div. 3, c. 2, §§ 370-385.
115
Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1944) §§ 370 to 385.
116 Cal. Pf6b. Code Ann. (Deering, 1944) §§ 370, 371 and 380.
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all persons interested in the will, including minors and incompetents, wherever residing, directing them to plead to the contest
within thirty days after service of the citation, which shall be made
personally or by publication in the manner provided by law for
the service of summons in civil actions. Any person so served may
demur to the contest upon any of the grounds of demurrer available in civil actions. If the demurrer is sustained, the court may
allow the contestant a reasonable time, not exceeding ten days,
within which to amend his contest. If the demurrer is overruled,
the petitioner and others interested, within ten days after the receipt of written notice thereof, may jointly or separately answer
the contest."
"Sec. 3 7 I. On the trial, the contestant is plaintiff and the
petitioner is defendant. Any issue of fact involving the competency
of the decedent to make a last will and testament, the freedom of
the decedent at the time of the execution of the will from duress,
menace, fraud, or undue influence, the due execution and attestation of the will, or any other question substantially affecting the
validity of the will, must be tried by a jury, unless a jury is waived
as provided by the Code of Civil Procedure. If no jury is demanded, the court must try and determine the issues joined."
"Sec. 380. When a will has been admitted to probate, any in-.
terested person, other than a party to a contest before probate and
other than a person who had actual notice of such previous contest
in time to have joined therein, may, at any time within six months
after such probate, contest the same or the validity of the will.
For that purpose he must file in the court in which the will was
proved a petition in writing, containing his allegations against the
validity of the will or against the sufficiency of the proof, and
praying that the probate be revoked~"
( c) Arizona. The Arizona statutes on contest 111 follow closely the
language of the California statutes of I 872 and are obviously copied
from them. The separate provisions for contest before and' after probate are set out as in the California statutes. The time for contest after
probate is one year with additional time for persons under disabilities.118
Arizona did not adopt the California amendtpent of r929 restricting
the parties who can contest after probate.110 According to one section 120
117

Ariz. Code (1939) §§ 38-210 to 38-212, 38-216 to 38-221.
Ariz. Code (1939) §§ 38-216, 38-221,
119 This is now Cal. Probate Code Ann. _{Deering, 1944) § 380, and provides that
"any interested person, other than a party to a contest before probate and other than a
person who had actual notice of such previous contest in time to have joined therein"
may contest after probate.
120
Ariz. Code (1939) § 38-216.
118
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of the Arizona Code, any interested person may contest after probate.
Indeed, in Estate of Biehn 121 the proponent of the will was permitted
to contest after probate. But according to another section,122 it may be
inferred that, if a person sui juris contested before probate, in person
or by an attorney of his own selection, he would be estopped to contest
after probate.
( d) Idaho. Idaho provisions on contest123 are almost the same as
those contained in the California Code of Civil Pi:ocedure of I 872,
except that the time for contest after probate is shorter. 124 Like Arizona,
they do not include the California amendment of I 929, which limits
the persons who can contest after probate where there has been a contest before probate. Under the Idaho code, an appeal from the probate
court to the district court is de nova unless it is an appeal on a question
of law alone and the error appears on the face of the record.125 Thus it
appears that it is possible to have three trials of the issue of will or no
will, although notice to interested parties precedes each of them.
( e) Utah. The Utah provisions 126 follow closely the California
Code of Civil Procedure of I 872, although some of the provisions of
the latter on will contest are omitted. Contest after probate is limited
to "any person who has not contested a will, or who has contested by
attorney appointed by the court without his knowledge." The time
limit for contest after probate was reduced from one year after probate
to six months in I943.121
(f) Montana and Wyoming. The provisions for will contest in
Montana 128 and Wyoming 129 follow very closely the California Code
121

41 Ariz. 403, 18 P. (2d) II12 (1933).
Ariz. Code (1939) § 38-208: "Any person interested may appear and contest the will by himself or by his guardian or attorney, appointed by himself or by the
court for that purpose; but a contest made by an attorney appointed by the court does
not bar a contest after probate by the party so represented, if commenced within the
time provided for the contes~ of wills after probate •..." And see Estate of Cunningham, 54 Cal. 556 (1880), interpreting a provision in the California Code similar to
this.
.
123
Idaho Laws Ann. (1943) §§ 15-210, 15-213 to 15-~17, 15-223 to 15-229.
124
According to Idaho J.aws Ann. (1943) § 15-223, the time is four months
after probate. But compare Idaho Laws Ann. (1943) § 15-229, which seems to refer
to a period of eight months after probate with a saving clause as to persons under disability.
125
Idaho Laws Ahn. (1943) § II-406. See, also, Lemp v. Lemp, 32 Idaho 393,
184 P. 222 (1919).
126
Utah Code Ann. (1943 and Supp. 1945) §§ 102-3-7 to 102-3-13.
127
Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1945) § 102-3-12.
128
Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) §§ 10029, 10032ioo38, 10042-10048.
129 Wyo. Rev. Stat. Ann (Courtright, 1931) §§ 88-601 to 88-607,' 88-701 to
88-707 (amended Laws 1945, c..3, 52).
122
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of Civil Procedure of l 872. In· Wyoming, however, the period for
contest after probate is six months after probate, and there is no extension of time for persons under disabilities.
(g) New Mexico. While the New Mexico legislation on will contests 130 shows the influence of the California Code of Civil Procedure
of 1872, it also shows marked variations. Probate is-with notice in the
probate court.13 i A contest before probate may take place in that
court.182 But if that court finds against the will, the case is then removed
to the district court and tried de nova, "the same as on appeal." 133 A
finding favorable to the will in the probate court may be contested in
that court at any time within six months, by "any person interested." 134
Appeal to the district court from a decision of the probate court approving or disapproving a will is permitted to "any party aggrieved."1 35
This appeal is with a trial de novo.136 It is evident that, under this legislation, it is possible to have three trials of the issue of will or no will.
(h) Nevada. The recently enacted Nevada legislation on will contests 187 follows closely the language of the California probate code of
1931. However, there are important variations. It is expressly provided that the attorney general, and also a devisee or legatee under a
former will, may contest before probate.m The time limit for contest
after probate is three months after the will was admitted to probate,139
and there is no saving clause for persons under disabilities as in the
corresponding California legislation.140 Like the California probate
code, this legislation permits a contest after probate only by "any interested person, other than a party to a contest before probate and other
than a person who had actual notice of such previous contest in time to
have joined therein." m
(i) The Dakota sub-group. Three states, North Dakota, South
J?akota and Oklahoma, have statutes on will contest which follow
closely the language of the California Code of Civil Procedure of 1872,
180
N. M. Stat. (1941 a~d Supp. 1945) §§ 32-207 to 32-220. Many of the sections were first enacted in New Mexico Laws 1889, c. 90.
m N.M. Stat. Ann. (1941) § 32-204.
182
N.M. Stat. Ann. (1941) § 32-209.
188
N.M. Stat. Ann. (1941) § 32-210. And see, also, § 32-214.
184
N.M. Stat. Ann. (1941) § 32-212.
185
N.M. Stat. Ann. (1941) §§ 32-2i5, 32-216.
m N.M. Stat. Ann (1941) § 19-1001.
187
Nev. Comp. Laws (Hillyer, Supp. 1941) §§ 9882.18 to 9882.27.
188
Nev. Comp. Laws (Hillyer, Supp. 1941) § 9882.18.
189
Nev. Comp. Laws (Hillyer, Supp. 1941) §§ 9882.22, 9882.26.
14
°
Cal. Probate Code (Deering, 193 l) § 384.
141
Nev. Comp. Laws (Hillyer, Supp. 1941) § 9882.22. This clause is the same
as that contained in Cal. Probate Code (Deering, 193 I) § 380.
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but which also have some important variations in common. The Dakota
Revised Codes of i 877 142 follow-the familiar pattern of the California
Code of l 872, with a group of sections entitled "Contesting probate of
wills" followed by a group on "Probate of foreign wills," after which is
found the subdivision .on "Contesting will after probate." Two important departures from the California pattern, which are still retained
by the three states referred to, are as follows. Contest, both before and
after probate, is tried by the court and not by a jury.148 Contest after
probate is permitted only on a showing of "evidence discovered since
the probate of the will." 144 The present Oklahoma statutes 145 follow
somewhat more closely than do those of the two Dakotas the language
of the Dakota Revised Codes of 1877.
,
The present North Dakota and South Dakota legislation 146 on will
contests shows some rearrangement and rewording, but on the whole
differs but slightly from that found in the Revised Codes of 1877.
It should be noted that, in North Dakota, South Dakota and Oklahoma the order admitting or ~enying probate of a will can be appealed
to the trial court of general jurisdiction and the case can there be tried
de novo.147 Thus, although the statutes on will contest might lead one
to suppose that a second trial of the issue is permitted only if there is
newly discovered evidence, in fact a second trial is permitted by the
device of an appeal with trial de novo,
(j) Other states in this class. In three otlier jurisdictions, namely
Colorado,148 the District of Columbia 149 and Iowa 150 the general plan
of permitting a will contest both before and after probate in the same
court is followed, although probate is always preceded by notice to inDakota Probate Code (1877) §§ 19, 22-27, 31-37.
Dakota Probate Code (1877) §§ 22, 34.
144
Dakota Probate Code (1877) § 31.
145
Okla. Stat. Ann. (1941) tit. 58, §§ 29, 41-46, 61-67. Trial by the court is
provided for by §§ 41, 64. The requirement that the contest after probate be based
on newly discovered evidence is contained in § 61.
146
N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §§ 30-0601 to 30-0613; S.D. Code Ann. (1939)
§§ 35.0301 to 35.0312.
147
N: D. Rev. Code (1943) § 30-2623; Okla. Stat. (1941) tit. 20, and tit. 58,'
§ 735; S.D. Code Ann. (1939) § 35.21n.
148
Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1935) c. 176, §§ 50, 51, 54 to 56, 63 to 65. The
right to contest after probate is limited to persons who were not summoned by actual
service of process and who did not appe~r at the probate. As to appeal with trial de novo,
see Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1935) c. 176, § 243.
149
D.C. Code (1940) §§ 19-308 to 19-312.
150
Iowa Code (Reichmann, 1939) §§ n863-n867, n882, and see § noo7.
The contest after probate is apparent).y a suit to set aside the will. See l McCAR.TY,
142
148

lowA PROBATE,

§ 318 (1942).
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terested parties. The Colorado and District of Columbia statutes expressly provide for the caveat and look a little like the system of probate in common and in solemn form with the addition of notice in all
cases to precede probate. In Colorado, in addition to contest before
and after probate in the county court, an appeal with trial de novo to
the trial court of general jurisdiction is permitted. Texas legislation
may also be classified here.1 G1 There is an express provision for contest
before probate. There is also a provision to the effect that, when a will
has been probated, a proceeding may be instituted to annul its provisions. Another statute limits the period within which a contest can be
instituted to four years after the will is admitted to probate. It is
further provided that a suit to cancel a will for forgery or fraud may be
instituted within four years after the discovery of the forgery or fraud.
It would seem that the proceeding to annul a will is broader than an
·ordinary proceeding to contest. Texas, however, also recognizes the appeal from the county court to the district court with trial de novo. If
we regard this appeal as the will contest, we should classify Texas legislation at a later point.

3. Contest in .a higher court after probate
Three states come under this general classification, although they
present substantial differences among themselves. They are Alabama,
Illinois and Ohio.
lGl Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1939) § 3315. "Any person interested in an
estate may, at any time before any character of proceeding is decided upon by the court,
file opposition thereto in writing •••."
As to notice before probate, see Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1939) § 3333.
Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1939) § 3433 provides that "When a will has
been probated, its provisions and directions shall be specifically executed, unless annulled or suspended by order of the court probating the same in a proceeding instituted for that purpose by some person interested in the estate••••"
Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1939) § 5534 provides that "Any person interested in any will which shall have been probated under the laws of this State may institute suit in the proper court to contest the validity thereof, within four years after
such will shall have been admitted to probate, and not afterward."
Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1939) § 5536 provides that an interested person "may institute suit in the proper court to cancel a will for forgery or other fraud
within four years after the discovery of such forgery or fraud ••••"
To the effect that there is a trial de novo on an appeal from the county court to
the district court, see Tex. Rules Civ. Proc. (Supp. 1944) Rule 33'4.
That the proceeding to annul is broader than the ordinary will contest is indicated
in Prather v. McClelland, 76 Tex. 574, 13 S.W. 543 (1890); Walker v. Irby, (Tex.
Civ. App., 1920) 229 S.W. 331, reversed in (Tex. Comm. App. 1922) 238 S.W.
884; Mason v. Brown, (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) 182 S.W. (2d) 729. To the effect
that§ 3433, quoted above, refers to the same subject matter as§ 5534, supra, see Cryer
v. Duren, (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) 164 S.W. (2d) 752.
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(a) Alabama. The scheme for will contest in Alabama resembles
somewhat the Virginia provisions already described/ 52 However, unlike Virginia, the Alabama legislation provides for notice prior to probate of the will in all cases.153 Contest before probate 154 may take place
if written objections to the probate of the will are filed in the probate
court. On the filing of such objections "an issue must be made up, under
the direction of the court, between the person making the application,
as plaintiff, and the person contesting the validity of the will, as defendant; and such issue must, on application of either party, be tried by
a jury." Any interested party who has not contested the will may, at
any time within six months after the will has been admitted to probate,
contest it by bill in equity in the circuit court.155 It is further provided
that1 56 "The circuit court may, in such case, direct an issue to be tried
by a jury, and on the trial before the jury, or hearing before the circuit
judge, the testimony of the witnesses reduced to writing by the judge
of probate, according to section 42 of this title is evidence to be considered by the judge or jury."
It is noticeable that Alabama still retains the two trials of the issue
of will or no will, in spite of the fact that notice of the first hearing as
well as the second is always given. It is true, a person cannot contest
after probate, if he has done so before probate, but the mere fact that
he was a party to the first proceeding, or a witness, does not preclude
him from contesting after probate.157 In Knox v. Paull 158 the court
··sought to defend the anomaly of two trials of the same issue of fact in
these words:
"Good reasons may be suggested for affording this additional
opportunity to contest the validity of a will which has been regularly acµnitted to probate after due notice to all parties in interest.
The application to prove the will usually follows close upon the
death of the testator. The application comes on for hearing as
soon as the short prescribed terms of notice have expired. It must
frequently happen that persons interested in the proceeding are
u 2 See Johnston v. Glasscock, 2 Ala. 218 at 237 (1841) •
. m Ala. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 61, §§ 48-50.

.
Ala. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 61, § 52. And see § 63, which provides for a
transfer of the contest to the circuit court.
155
Ala. Code Ann. ( l 940) tit. 61, § 64. An extension of time is given to persons under disabilities, tit. 61, § 66.
156
Ala. Code Ann (1940) tit. 61, § 67.
157
Breeding v. Grantland, 135 Ala. 497, 33 S. 545 (1902); Knox v. Paull,
95 Ala. 505, II S. 156 (1891).
158
95 Ala. 505 at 509, II S. 156 (1891).
15

"

WILL CONTESTS

537

wholly unable, while it is pending, to inform themselves as to the
instruments offered for probate, or of the circumstances attending
its execution. Facts affecting its validity may be developed afterwards, and the failure to discover them, or to obtain the evidence
to prove them, may have been without the fault or any lack of diligence on the part of those interested in making a contest."
(b) Illinois. Illinois, like Kentucky, took over the Virginia plan of
contest in chancery.159 It, however, added not only a provision for an
appeal to the trial court of general jurisdiction with trial de nova, but
also a requirement of notice for the initiation of the :first probate.160
Under an earlier form of the Illinois statute it was held that a contestant could carry on one contest by appeal from the probate court
decision and another at the same time by bill in chancery. And he might
also move to have the probate in the county court set aside.161 Apparently much the same thing is possible under the probate code of 1939,102
although the contest is not called a contest in chancery. At the present
time there may be a contest in the county or probate court before probate solely on the ground of "fraud, forgery, compulsion, or other improper conduct which in the opinion of the probate court is deemed
sufficient to invalidate or destroy the will." 163 Otherwise there is a
statutory contest after probate in the circuit court.164 An appeal from
the decision of the probate court with trial de nova is still possible.165
(c) Ohio. In Ohio there can be no contest until after probate. The
will is probated in the probate court after notice.168 Then the statute
provides for a contest within six months in the common pleas court.167
This proceeding is with trial de novo.168 There can be no appeal, howu 9 Luther v. Luther, 122 Ill. 558, 13 N.E. 166 (1887); Dibble v. Winter, 247
Ill. 243, 93 N.E. 145 (1910).
160
The provision for notice seems to have appeared in 1897. See Ill. Laws 1897,
p. 304. As to the present provision, see Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1941) c. 3, § 216.
161
See Wright v. Simpson, 200 Ill. 56, 65 N.E. 628 (1902); Buergner v. Buergner, 317 Ill. 401, 148 N.E. 274 (1925); 1 HoRNER, PROBATE PRACTICE AND EsTATES,
4th ed.,§ 89 (1940).
162
Handley v. Conlan, 342 Ill. 562, 174 N.E. 855 (1931); I HoRNER, PROBATE PRACTICE AND EsTATEs, 4th ed.,§ 89 (1940).
163
Ill Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1941) c. 3, § 221; I HoRNER, PROBATE PRACTICE AND ESTATES, 4th ed., § 66 ( I 940).
164
Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1941) c. 3, § 242.
165
Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith..:Hurd, 1941) c. 3, §§ 223, 484 and 487.
166
Ohio Gen. Code (Page, Supp. 1945) § 10504-17.
167
Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1937 and Supp. 1945) §§ 10504-32 and 10504-33.
168
Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1937 and Supp. 1945) §§ 12079 to 12085.
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ever, from the order of the probate court admitting the will to probate,
since that is not regarded as a final order.169

4. Contest before·probaterappeal with trial de novo in a higher court
One of the most numerous groups of states is that in which the proceeding to probate is initiated with notice and, in terms, contest is permitted only before probate; but in fact by permitting an appeal with
trial de novo in the trial court of general jurisdiction a contest after
probate in a higher court is recognized. Besides the states already mentioned in other groups which superimpose the device of an appeal with
trial de novo, the following jurisdictions may fairly be classified here:
Connecticut,11° Kansas,111 Maine,112 Michigan,118 Minnesota,174 Nebraska,175 Rhode Island,116 Vermont 177 and Wisconsin.178 In Michigan,
the probate may not only be appealed to the trial court of general jurisdiction, but the case may be transferred to that court as soon as the heirs
file a contest and before the will has been probated.119 As has been said,
Wisconsin only in part comes within this classification. In its more populous areas, the appeal is direct to the supreme court and is on the
record. 180 If we do not regard the Texas proceeding to annul a will as
a contest after probate, Texas might well be classified here.181
169 In re Estate of Frey, 139 Ohio St. 354, 40 N.E. (2d) 145 (1942). But there
is an appeal to the common pleas c;ourt with trial de novo from an order of the probate
court denying probate, if there was no record taken at the hearing in probate. See
Ohio Gen. Code (Page, Supp. 1945) § 10501-56.
17°Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) § 4884; trial de novo, § 5624.
171 Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, Supp. 1943) §§ 59-2220 to 59-2225; trial
de novo, § 59-2408 (amended by Laws 1945, c. 237).
172
Me. Rev. Stat. (1944) c. 141, §§ 5 to 8; trial de novo, c. 140, § 37.
178
Mich. Stat. Ann. (1943) §§ 27.3178(90) to 27.3178(94); trial de novo,
§ 27.3178(42).
174 Minn. Stat. (1941) §§ 525.23 to 525.241; trial de novo, § 525.72.
176 Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943) § 30-217; trial de novo, § 30-1606.
176 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. (1938) c. 572, § 7; trial de novo, c. 573, §§ 1, 4.
111
·
Vt. Pub. Laws (1933) § 2763; trial de novo, § 3016 (amended Laws 1941,
No: 42.)
"
.
"
178 Wis. Stat. ( 1943) §§ 3 10.04 to 3 10.06; trial de novo, § 3 24.0 3 (orr appeal to
circuit court from county court in counties of less than 15,000 population).
179 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1943) § 27.3178(36).
180 Wis. Stat. (1943) § 324.01. In these more populous counties, the contest
may be removed from the county court ,to the circuit court for trial when a jury is
demanded. Wis. Stat. (1943) § 324.17, subd. 8.
181 See note 151, supra.
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V
THE RATIONALE OF THE WILL CONTEST

From the foregoing survey of wilf contest legislation, in which a
few glimpses of historical development are interspersed, the legislative
trends should be apparent. Many of our legislatures appear to have
approached the problem on the assumption that the contest after probate in the manner of the probate in solemn form is an accepted legal
device, without realizing why that is true. They thereupon took that
device and amended it, by adding a requirement of notice for the original probate or by permitting an appeal with trial de nova, so that the
resulting product allowed, not one trial after notice, but two, and in
some instances even three, trials of the issue of will or no will. In a few
isolated instances-notably in the case of New York and Virginia-we
find an eventual return to the norm of one trial of the issue. In still
other states the pattern apparently is based on the assumption that the
issue of will or no will is like any other issue; that notice must be given
to interested parties prior to probate and then any contest must take
place before probate. But to this perfectly rational conception of the
will contest is commonly added the appeal with trial de nova in the trial
court of general jurisdiction.
Taking up in order the types of will contest legislation in accordance with the preceding survey, it is clear that a rational basis exists
for those which follow the pattern of the English probate without notice, first, because estates commonly need the supervision of the executor immediately on the death of the testator; and, second, because in
the vast majority of cases there is not the remotest possibility of a contest and the probate of the will can be reduced to an administrative
formality. But since the heir then has no opportunity to contest before
probate, he must be given that opportunity afterward.
Moreover, the same reasons would justify a contest in chancery
after probate where no notice is given for the initial probate. The fact
that it is in chancery may be explained on the ground that a more com-petent tribunal is needed for a contested than for an uncontested probate; and that if the heir wishes to have a contest after probate in such
a tribunal, he may do so. Parenthetically, it should be pointed out, however, that the resemblance of this device to the framing of the issue of
devisavit vel non in English chancery in the case of litigation over the
title to devised land is largely superficial. Unlike the English historical
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counterpart, the American contest in chancery is commonly in rem and
is a part of the original probate proceeding.182
Where the proceeding is initiated with notice, we must seek a different rationalization. It is true, the Alabama court 188 suggested that,
even with notice before probate, the time prior to the hearing would be
so short that little opportunity would be a:fforded to the heirs to ascertain facts on which a contest could be b?sed. However, it is difficult to
see why that should be so. The facts existing at the time of the execution of the will or at the testator's death are just as readily ascertainable
as the facts involving a suit relative to the execution of a contract or
deed. And the action with respect to the contract or deed may be tried
just as speedily after notice as the suit for the probate of a will. Thus it
would seem that in those jurisdictions, such as the California group,
where there may be contest both before and after probate, there is no
satisfactory basis for contest after probate. It is largely an historical survival of probate in solemn form, the reason for which disappeared
when probate with notice to interested parties was required.
It is true, in several states of the California group, the same ·person
cannot initiate a contest both before and after probate. Thus, in California, in order to contest after probate, it must appear that the contestant was not a party to the first contest and did not have actual notice of it in time to participate.18' There is nothing in this statute, however, which bars an heir from contesting after probate where he had
notice before probate but there was no contest. In the Dakota group
the opportunity to contest after probate is further limited by the requirement of showing of "evidence discovered since the probate of the
will." 185 It would look as if the contest after probate in this group of
states could be justified on the ground that its operation is about as restricted as the motion for a new trial in a civil action. However, in all
three states of the Dakota group, legislation permits an appeal with
trial de novo as well as a contest after probate. This appeal is objectionable on the grounds hereafter to be pointed out.
Is there any justification for the contest after probate, in jurisdictions which require notice before probate, if that contest is in a higher
tribunal? And is there any justification in such jurisdictions, for an ap182

See Simes, "The Administration of a Decedent's Estate as a Proceeding in
Rem," 43 M1cH. L. REv. 675 at 679 and 688 to 691 (1945)~
188
See note I 58, supra.
18
' See page 530, supra.
185
See page 534, supra.
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peal with trial de novo in a higher tribunal? It would seem that the
answer to these questions is the same. Doubtless the reason for the appeal with trial de novo in the trial court of general jurisdiction is the
same as that for the typical provision for appeal from the judgment
of a justice court. The legislature has very little confidence in the competency of the judge; he might be a layman, and rules of law might be
disregarded; if anybody objects, his case can be tried before a judge
who is learned in the law. The same explanation could be given for the
jurisdictions which permit a proceeding· called a contest in a higher
tribunal. In either type of contest, it would seem that the retrial of the
issue in the higher court is unjustified, if it can also be tried in the probate court. That is to say, if the probate 1udge is not competent to preside over a contested probate, he ought not to be allowed to do so at all.
If he is competent, then the case does not need to be tried anew in another court.
It should be pointed out that the Ohio provisions for contest are
distinguishable and are perfectly rational. There the will is admitted to
probate in the probate court on notice, and the contest can take place
only after probate and only in the common pleas court. A lay judge
may be competent to handle an uncontested probate though he could
not properly preside over a will contest case. Hence, the Ohio legislation provides for an uncontested probate in the probate court, and a
contest in the common pleas court. But one criticism of this plan may
be suggested: in theory it gives an advantage to the proponent of the
will as against the contestant for the contestant must always oppose an
already probated will. But it is believed that this advantage is more
theoretical than actual.
What types of will contest legislation, then, will stand the test of
rational analysis? From the foregoing discussion, we may conclude that
there are essentially three. First, in jurisdictions which permit probate without notice, contest can take place after probate, either in the
same or in another tribunal, if initiated by persons who had no notice of
the first probate. But the addition to this pattern of an appeal with trial
de nova is without justification. Second, in jurisdictions which require
notice to interested parties before probate and which permit contest
before probate, there is no reason for contest after probate either by that
name or in the guise of an appeal with trial de nova. Such a jurisdiction should regard the issue of will or no will just like any issue raised
in a civil action; it must be raised before trial and determined by the
judgment or decree. Third, the Ohio pattern of an uncontested probate
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in the probate court and a contest in the co.rnrnon pleas court only after
probate is perfectly rational in th,at it recognizes that the common pleas
court is competent to try a contest but that the probate court is not.

VI
THE FUNCTION OF CONTEST AFTER PROBATE IN RELATION TO
CERTAIN SPECIFIC PROBLEMS

A considerable body .of litigation has arisen involving this question:
What is the relation of contest after probate to the prior proceeding for
probate of the will? Is it like an appeal? Is it like a proceeding to
vacate a judgment? Is it a proceeding in rem like the original proceeding to probate? Is it in fact a part of the proceeding to probate
and not an independen~ proceeding? Of course, in jurisdictions where
the contest is an appeal with trial de nova, the character of the proceeding is in part determined by its name: it is an appeal and for most
purposes, therefore, is a part of the original proceeding to probate. Indeed, as to most types of contest, it is commonly held that the contest is
in rem and is for most purposes a part of the original proceeding to
probate.186
.
However, the function and character of the contest after probate
cannot be determined in a vacuum. It must be considered in the light
of its application to concrete problems which have faced the courts. We
shall, therefore, examine some of these problems in order to ascertain
whether they throw light on our analysis of the function of contest after
probate.
·

r. Federal jurisdiction arising from diversity in citizenship
The Federal Code provid~ 187 that the district courts shall have
original jurisdiction "of all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in
equity .... between citizens of different states" where the matter in
controversy is within the jurisdictional amount. It likewise provides 188
for the removal to the federal district courts, by a nonresident defendant, of "any suit of a civil nature, at law or in equity" of which the federal district courts have original jurisdiction. It is uniformly held that
a proceeding to probate a will, or to administer the estate of a decedent,
is not a suit of a civil nature at common law or in equity within the
186

See note 182, supra.
Fed. Code Ann., tit. 28, § 41.
188
Fed. Code Ann., tit. 28, § 71.

187
,
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meaning of these statutes.189 The reason doubtless is that Congress contemplated the various English tribunals in which suits were once tried
--chancery, common law courts, ecclesiastical courts, and admiralty
courts--and that, in this historical classification, the ordinary function
of the ecclesiastical tribunal in probating wills was regarded as outside
the purview of suits at common law or in equity. While the meaning
of these terms is not wholly tied down to the historical English division
of jurisdiction, it is clear that history determined once and for all that
a proceeding in the nature of a hearing in an English ecclesiastical
court to determine whether a will should be admitted to probate is not
within the jurisdiction of the federal district courts.
Hence, our question is this: Is the proceeding to contest a will to
such an extent ancillary to, a part of, or the same as, the proceeding to
probate the will that the federal courts will likewise refuse to take
jurisdiction? The answer, of course, depends upon the nature of will
contests in the particular state. In general, the federal decisions indicate that the will contest cannot be tried in the federal courts unless it
is a proceeding independent of the proceeding to probate the will and
unless it is inter partes. The precise meaning of this test will be clarified
by consideration of four leading decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States relative thereto.
Gaines v. Fuentes 190 involved the removal, on grounds of diverse
citizenship, of a suit brought in the courts of Louisiana to annul a will
as a muniment of title to real estate. Mr. Justice Field, speaking for
the majority of the court, expressed the vi~w that the jurisdiction of
federal courts in removal cases was more extensive than their original
jurisdiction where diverse citizenship was involved, and concluded that
this case could be removed solely on the ground of diversity of citizenship and without regard to the character of the controversy. He, however, went on to indicate that the federal courts would haye had original jurisdiction. He observed: "The suit in the parish court is not a
proceeding to establish a will, but to annul it as a muniment of title,
and to limit the operation of the decree admitting it to probate. It is,
in all essential particulars, a suit for equitable relief,-to cancel an
instrument alleged to be void, and to restrain the enforcement of a
decree alleged to have been obtained upon false and insufficient testimony." He conceded that the federal courts have no original probate
jurisdiction to establish wills. "The reason lies," he said, "in the nature
1 9

s Sutton v. English, 246 U.S. 199 at 205, 38 S. Ct. 254 (1918).
92 U.S. IO (1875).

190
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of the proceeding to probate a will as one in rem, which does not necessarily involve any controversy between parties: indeed, in the majority
of instances, no such controversy exists." Three justices dissented on
the ground that the proceeding was essentially to revoke the probate
of the will, and that the jurisdiction of the federal courts in removal ·
cases was limited by their originai jurisdiction in cases between citizens
of different states. It is to be noted that, whatever tq.e scope of the removal statute may have been at that time, it was modified in r887 so
·that its scope was thereafter limited, in most situations, in the same way
as the court's original jurisdiction.101
In Ellis v. Davis,192 a bill in equity was instituted in the federal
, court of Louisiana to recover possession of real estate and to set aside
a will which had been admitted to probate by the state c_ourts of
Louisiana. On a demurrer, the bill was dismissed. This decision was
affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States. The basis of the
decision was merely that, under Louisiana law, there is no jurisdiction
in· equity to revoke a probate and that the proper proceeding is by an
action of revendication, which could be brought in the federal court.
The Court pointed out that, under the English practice, the validity
of wills involving real estate could be determined as to a particular
piece of land by an action of ejectment; and that in jurisdictions where
this action is still permissible to determine the validity of a will, it
could doubtless be instituted in the federal court, provided diversity of
citizenship exists. The court further observed, however, that in many
states the probate of wills involving land had been given conclusive
force until set aside and that

"In states where it is held to have a conclusive force, formal
modes are prescribed of contesting the validity of the instrument
as a will, and of the regularity and legality of the probate, by
suits regularly instituted solely for that purpose, and inter partes;
but such procee_dings are generally regarded as the exercise of pro191 The earlier statute permitted removal of "any suit of a civil nature at law or in
equity •.• where the matter in dispute exceeds ... and arising under the Constitution
or laws of the United States .•. or in which the United States shall be plaintiff or
peti!ioner, or in which there shall be a controversy between citizens of different states,"
but limited original jurisdiction to "suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity''
involving federal questions. 18 Stat. L. 470, §§ 1, 2 (1875). In 1887 the removal
statute expressly limited removal to cases over which the federal courts are given original jurisdiction. 24 Stat. L. 553, § 2 (1887). See the discussion of these statutes in
In re Cilley, (C. C. N. H. 1893) 58 F. 977.
192
109 U.S. 485, 3 S. Ct. 327 (1883).
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bate jurisdiction, even if administered in courts other than that of
original probate, but the judgment, as in other cases inter partes,
binds only parties and privies."
In Farrell v. O'Brien,193 a bill in equity was filed in the federal
court to enjoin distribution under a will probated in the state of Washington on the ground that the will was not validly executed. The
court determined that the suit, if considered as a Washington proceeding to contest the will, could not be brought in the federal court. The
test laid down was as follows: "That where a state law, statutory or
customary, gives to citizens of the State, in an action or suit inter partes,
the right to question at law the probate of a will or to assail probate in
a suit in equity the courts of the United States in administering the
rights of citizens of other States or aliens will enforce such remedies."
The court then inquired what was meant by the expression "action or
suit inter partes," and concluded that "the words referred to must relate only to independent controversies inter partes, and not to mere
controversies which may arise on an application to probate a will because the state law provides for notice, or to disputes concerning the
setting aside of a probate, when the remedy to set aside afforded by the
state law is a mere continuation of the probate proceeding, that is to
say, merely a method of procedure ancillary to the original probate,
allowed by the state law for the purpose of giving to the probate its
ultimate and final effect." The court then pointed out that if the requirement of an independent suit were not imposed, all inter partes
proceedings to contest a will could be removed to the federal court. It
should be observed that in the state of Washington, probate and contest are in the trial court of general jurisdiction. Yet the court stated
that, under the Washington law, the contest was "special in character"
and the decree revoking a will already admitted to probate would
"inure not only to the benefit of the particular contestant," but was
"operative as to the whole world."
In Sutton v. English,194 the federal court was held to be without
jurisdiction of a bill in equity to set aside a will probated in Texas,
where the requisite diversity of citizenship existed. The court stated
the rule thus:
"By a series of decisions in this court it has been established
that since it does not pertain to_ the general jurisdiction of a court
of equity to set aside a will or the probate thereof, or to administer
193
194

199 U.S. 89, 25 S. Ct. 727 (1905).
246 U.S. 199, 38 S. Ct. 254 (1918).
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upon the estates of decedents in rem, matters of this character are
not within the ordinary equity jurisdiction of the federal courts;
••• that where a State, by statute or custom, gives to parties interested the right to bring an action or suit inter partes, either at
law or in equity, to annul a will or to set aside the probate, the
courts of the United States, where diversity of citizenship and a
sufficient amount in controversy appear, can enforce the same
· remedy, but that this relates only to independent suits, and not to
procedure merely incidental or ancillary to the probate.•••"
The court then determined that th~ Texas proceeding in the district court to contest a will was essentially a proceeding to review by
appeal or certiorari and was supplemental to- the original probate proceeding.
What these decisions appear to mean is this: A proceeding to determine whether a will should be admitted to probate is not a civil suit at
law or in equity. Any proceeding after probate, which is ancillary to
the original probate proceeding is so much a proceeding to probate that
it likewise cannot be within the federal jurisdiction based on diversity
of citizenship. But if it is an independent proceeding, and if it is inter
partes, and if it is in the court of law or of equity, then it may be within the federal jurisdiction. The court seems to have wavered with
respect to its meaning of the term "inter partes." Does it mean that
the proceeding is not in rem? Or does it mean that there are parties
who are contesting and that the suit is not ex parte? It would seem
that the latter is meant. If it is, then every will contest, whether be- ,
fore or after probate, is inter partes, since there are parties who are
opposing each other, even though its judgment operates in rem. Thus
the court is compelled to limit the jurisdiction to those suits inter partes
which are independent proceedings.
Parenthetically it should be observed that the court apparently assumes that, even though the proceeding operates in rem, the diversity
of citizenship requireme.iJ.t can be met. Of course, a formal argument
could be made to the effect that, since all persons in the world are
parties, it can never be true that all the plaintiffs will be citizens of
different states from all the defendants. But it is believed that, if the
point were raised, the court would have to conclude that "parties" for
this purpose does not _mean all persons bound by the judgment, but
merely those actively participating in the litigation or named and
served as· parties.195
195

See Madisonville ,Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239,
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It should further be pointed out that the re_quirement of an independent proceeding is not a generalization as to all federal jurisdiction based upon diversity of citizenship. Doubtless there are situations
outside the probate field where the reverse might be held.100 Apparently what is meant is that, unless we lay down the requirement of
an independent proceeding, we bring all will contest cases within the
federal jurisdiction, and since it is clear that this was not the legislative
purpose, we must lay down this special restriction as to will cases.
Our final question is: How may we classify the various types of
contest after probate? Are they excluded from the federal jurisdiction
by the rule which the Supreme Court of the United States has laid
down? As to the contest on an appeal with trial de novo, the decision
in the case of Sutton v. English, supra, in whicli that type of contest
was discussed, makes it clear that it is not removable. Moreover, a
contest which is in the nature of probate in solemn form, or of a
statutory proceeding to contest in the same court as that in which the
original probate was had, would seem, under the decision in Farrell v.
O'Brien, supra, with respect to the Washington procedure, to be outside the federal jurisdiction. Decisions of lower federal courts denying jurisdiction as to one or the other of these varieties of contests are
found with respect to contest proceedings in Arkansas,101 Indiana,108
Pennsylvania,100 New Hampshire,2° 0 Maine,201 and Mississippi.202 In
the federal court for Georgia, 208 the jurisdiction of the federal court
was recognized in a removal of an appeal with trial de novo on probate
in solemn form in the superior court. But a later decision 204 as to a
Georgia contest denied removal where there had been no probate but
only a caveat in the court of ordinary for the purpose of securing pro25 S. Ct. 251 (1905), in which a statutory proceeding to take land by eminent domain
was held removable; New Orleans v. Gaines's Admr., 138 U.S. 595, II S. Ct. 428
(1891), involving a representative suit in which the court said that "representatives
may stand upon their own citizenship in the federal courts irrespective of the citizenship of the persons whom they represent,--such as executors, administrators, guardians,
trustees, receivers, etc."
196
See Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403 (1879).
197
Wahl v. Franz, (C.C.A. 8th, 1900) 100 F. 680.
198
Copeland v. Bruning, (C.C. Ind. 1896) 72 F. 5.
199
ln re Aspinwall's Estate, (C.C. Pa. 1897) 83 F. 851.
200
In re Cilley, (C.C. N.H. 1893) 58 F. 977.
201
Thompson v. Nichols, (D.C. Me. 1919) 254 F. 973.
202
In re Armistead's Estate, (D.C. Miss. 1933) 4 F. Supp. 606.
208
Brodhead v. Shoemaker, (C.C. Ga. 1890) 44 F. 518.
20
" Meadow v. Nash, (D.C. Ga. 1918) 250 F. 9n.
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bate in solemn form. Moreover, decisions of the federal courts with
respect to Iowa 205 and Oregon 200 contest procedure recognize federal
jurisdiction; but they, like the earlier Georgia case, were decided before the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Farrell v. O'Brien
emphasized the requirement that the contest must be an independent
proceeding. Where the contest consists of a statutory proceeding either
at law or in equity in a higher court which is a court of general jurisdiction, the lower federal decisions show a still greater conflict. It is
held that a contest under Virginia 201 or Ohio 208 procedure is not removable; but that a contest under Illinois 209 or New Yark 210 procedure is removable. Decisions as· to the Missouri procedure are in
conflict; 211 but the most recent is in favor of permitting removal to the
federal court. However, all these detjsions, except that concerning
the New York procedure, were rendered prior to Farrell v. O'Brien,
supra. The New York decision, rendered just after Farrell v. O'Brien
was decided, is concerned with a procedure not now existing in New
York.212
'
In conclusion, it is reasonably clear, on the one hand, that contest
by appeal with trial de nova, or by probate in solemn form, is regarded
as a part of the original probate for purposes of federal jurisdiction
based on diversity. of citizenship. It would seem, also, that the usual
statutory contest proceeding, whether it be brought in the same court
in which the probate proceeding was initiated, or in a higher court, is
sufficiently a part of the original probate that the federal courts would
not take jurisdiction.213 Certainly, the fact that a statutory contest is
brought in the trial court of general jurisdiction or in chancery does not
make the case removable on the ground of diversity of citizenship. 214
205
Wart v. Wart, (C.C. Iowa 1902) II7 F. 766. The court termed the Iowa
contest proceeding an "original proceeding."
206
Richardson v. Green, (C.C.A. 9th, 1894) 61 F. 423.
201
Guilfoil v. Hayes, (C.C.A. 4th, 1936) 86 F. (2d) 544.
208
Reed v. Reed, (C.C. Ohio 1887) 31 F. 49.
209
Williams v. Crabb, (C.C.A. 7th, 1902) u7 F. 193.
210
McDermott v. Hannon, (D.C. N.Y. 1913) 203 F. 1015_.
211
Not permitting removal: Oakley v. Taylor, (C.C. Mo. 1894) 64 F. 245; permitting removal: Sawyer v. White, (C.C.A. 8th, 1903) 122 F. 223.
212 Since 1914, contest after probate has not existed in New York. See p. 527
supra.
213
This seems to be the import of the observation of the court, already quoted, in
Ellis v. Davis, 109 U.S. 485.at 496, 3 S. Ct. 327 (1883).
214
ln re Armistead's Estate, (D.C. Miss. 1933) 4 F. Supp. 606; Guilfoil v.
Hayes, (C.C.A. 4th, 1936) 86 F. (2d) 544.
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On the other hand, the practically obsolete contest of a will by means
of an action at law in the nature of ejectment, which is purely inter
partes and has no operation in rem, could doubtless be tried in the federal courts in a proper case. And the peculiar Louisiana proceeding to
annul probate, which seems to resemble that procedure, is likewise
within the federal jurisdiction.215 Doubtless, a case such as Creek v.
Laski,216 in which a legatee sued an heir in a tort action for wrongfully
destroying an unprobated will, could be tried in the federal court. on
grounds of diversity of citizenship, though the due execution of the
will is in issue. While, as has been seen, the federal decisions indicate
that there is still some uncertainty about the statutory contest proceeding brought in a higher court than that in which the probate was
initiated, it is believed to be a reasonable deduction from the decisions
of the Supreme Court of the United States on this subject to say this:
In most states in which a proceeding to contest after probate exists,
the action cannot be tried in the federal court on grounds of diversity
of citizenship, because it is a part of the original proceeding to probate
the will.
2. Who has the affirmative of the issue?
One question which we shall raise, only to discard, as an aid in
determining the character of contest after probate, is this: Who is
plaintiff in such a contest? Who has the affirmative of the issue
will or no will? The answer to this question should ·aid us in
determining who has the right to open artd close; who has the burden
of proof; and what is the relation between the original probate and
contest after probate. Frequently the matter comes up in connection
with instructions or rulings on burden of proof. Of course, general
questions, such as whether or not mental incapacity or undue influence
are affirmative defenses, are not relevant here. The only question which
is related to the nature of the contest after probate is this: Is there a
different rule as to the burden of proof in a contest after probate as
compared with a contest before probate? Concededly, the proponent,
in the absence of a statute to the contrary, would have the affirmative
of all issues which are not matters of affirmative defense, and the true
burden of proving whatever is necessary to make out a case in a contest
before probate. But does he still have that burden in a contest after
probate? Is he still the plaintiff, or is the contestant the plaintiff? The
215
216

Fakouri v. Cadais, (C.C.A. 5th, 1945) 147 F. (2d) 667.
248 Mich. 425, 227 N.W. 817, 65 A.L.R. u13 (1929).

550

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

answer in the cases is confusing and unsatisfactory. Often, we are not
told whether burden of proof means burden of going forward with the
evidence, or the true burden of proof which Professor Wigmore has
referred to as the risk of non-persuasion. 211 Moreover, discussions of
burden of proof commonly make no distinction between the situations
before and after probate. Furthermore, statutes in a number of states
produce a result which is difficult to rationalize.
Conceivably, courts might analyze the contest after probate in
either one of two ways. They might say: this is like probate in solemn
form; the idea is that the first proof was inadequate and was without
notice; hence we should have as completely a retrial of the issue as
possible and should make it correspond to the original probate as to
parties and as to burden of proof. Thus, the proponent would still be
the plaintiff and would have the burden of showing the due execution
of the will. Or the courts may approach the matter somewhat as follows: the will has already been admitted to probate; any attack on the
decree admitting it can be regarded as in the nature of a proceeding to
set aside a judgment; hence the contestant is plaintiff and has the burden of proving that the will should be set aside. In so far as it is possible to determine from the decisions, each of these two methods of
approach has been followed in a number of jurisdictions.218 There
9 W1GMORE, EvmENCE, 3d ed., §§ 2485-2489 (1940).
Estate of Hayes, 55 Col. 340, 135 P. 449 (1913) (contestant has burden of
proof on issues raised by them); Wheeler v. Rockett, 91 Conn. 388, 100 A. 13 (1917)
(proponent has burden of proof); Mobley v. Lyon, 134 Ga. 125, 67 S.E. 668 (1909)
(proponent has burden of proof); Miller v. Blumenshine, 343 Ill. 531, 175 N.E. 814
(1931) (burden of proof does not shift from proponents to contestants); Pepper v•
.Martin, 175 Ind. 580; 92 N.E. 777 (19rn) (contestants have burden of proof); Convey v. Murphy, 146 Iowa 154, 124 N.E. 1073 (1910) (contestant has burden of
proof, the contest is an independent action); Taff v. Hosmer, 14 Mich. 309 (1866)
[proponent has burden of proof; but see In re Reed's Estate, 273 Mich. 334, 263
N.W. 76 (1935)]; Isom v. Canedy, 128 Miss. 64, 88 S. 485 (1921) (proponent has
burden of proof); Rock v. Keller, 312 Mo. 458, 278 S.W. 759 (1926) (proponent
has burden of proof); In re Estate of.Bayer, 119 Neb. 191, 227 N.W. 928 (1929)
(on appeal with trial de novo, burden of proof is on proponent); Patten v. Cilley, 67
N.H. 520, 42 A. 47 (1893) (proponent has burden of proof); In re Sturtevant's
Estate, 92 Ore. 269, 178 P. 192 (1919) (proponent must reprobate the will by
original proof); Renn v. Samos, 33 Tex. 760 (1871) (contestant has burden of proof);
Williams v. Robinson, 42 Vt. 658 (1870) (on appeal with trial de novo, burden of
proof is on proponent, as if the proceeding were commenced in that court); Dickens v•.
Bonnewell, 160 Va. 194, 168 S.E. 610 (1933) (proponent has burden of proof); In re
Estate of McKachney, 143 Wash. 28, 254 P •. 455 (1927) [contestant has burden of
proof, as provided by Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932) § 1387]; Kerr v.
Lunsford, 31 W. Va. 659 (1888) (proponent has burden of proof).
217

218
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seems to be also a third approach found in statements of the courts to
the effect that the proponent must make a prima facie case by proving
formal execution of the will, after which the contestant has the burden
of proving all his grounds of contest. 219 The latter approach is inconsistent with the proposition that the true burden of proof never
shifts; and it is not clear that, in the absence of statute, these statements are meant to deny that proposition.220
'
A few illustrations will demonstrate how little relation exi$tS between the decisions on such questions as burden of proof and right to
open and close and the question of the true function of contest after
probate.
In the contest after probate in Missouri, the contestant is referred
to as plaintiff and the proponent as defendant. Yet it is held that the
proponent has the true burden of proof and the right to open and
close. 221 On the other hand in Ohio the cases indicate that the contestant has the burden of proof 222 and that "in order to set aside a will
the evidence adduced in the case against the will must outweigh both
the evidence adduced in favor of the will and the presumption arising
from the order of the probate court admitting the will to probate as the
valid last will and testament of the testator." 228 Yet the Ohio statutes
on will contest include the following provision: 224 "The party sustaining the will shall be entitled to open and close the evidence and argument. He must offer the will and probate, and rest. The opposite
party then shall offer his evidence; the party sustaining the will then
must offer his other evidence. Rebutting evidence may be offered as in
other cases." While this statute is primarily concerned with the burden
9f going forward with the evidence, it would seem also to indicate a
view as to the party who has the affirmative of the issue, which is hard
to reconcile with some of the judicial pronouncements.
219
Fernstrom v. Taylor, 107 Fla. 490 at 494, 145 S. 208 (1933); May v. May,
175 Ga. 693, 165 S.E. 617 (1932); [but see Mobley v. Lyon, 134 Ga. 125, 67 S.E.
668 (1909)]; In re Estate of Wallace, 158 Kan. 633, 149 P. (2d) 595 (1944);
Brehony v. Brehony, 289 Pa. 267, 137 A. 260 ( 1927); See also cases under the California type of statute, discussed infra. See annotation, 76 A.L.R. 373 (1932).
220
To the effect that the burden of proof may be said to shift in certain exceptional situations, see Morgan, "Some Observations Concerning Presumptions," 44 HARV.
L. REV. 906 (1931).
221
Morrow v. Board of Trustees, (Mo. 1944) 181 S.W. (2d) 945.
222
McFarland v. Clark, 8 Ohio App. 326 at 3 3 1 ( 1918). In general, see cases to
this effect cited in DEIBEL, OHIO PROBATE LAW 622 (1936).
228
Van Demark v. Tompkins, 121 Ohio St. 129 at 133, 167 N.E. 370 (1929).
m Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1937) § 12085.
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- One would suppose that, where contest after probate consists in
probate in solemn form, the proponent would always have the affirmative of the issue. In South Carolina the proponent is the petitioner
and presumably would have the burden of proof,225 but the Maryland
court has indicated that the caveator is plaintiff.226 In Virginia the court
has held that the burden is on the proponent in a proceeding 9n the
issue devisavit vel non,227 it being suggested that the analogous English
proce_ecling to determine title to land in an action -of ejectment would
place the burden on the devisee.
The most extraordinary situation is found in California and other
states which have enacted similar provisions as to will contests. A provision found in the codes of these states is to the effect that "the contestant is plaintiff and the petitioner is defendant." 228 It should be observed that this provision applies equally to contest before probate
and to contest after probate. Hence, if taken literally one might reach
the absurd conclusion that, if no evidence at all were introduced at the
contest before probate, the will would in all cases be admitted to probate. In order to avoid such a conclusion, the California courts have
held that there are two separate proceedings in the hearing on the
will before probate; there is an ex parte proceeding in which the proponent has the burden of proof and there is at the same time the contest in which the contestant has the burden of proof. In Estate of
Relph,229 the court stated this doctrine in these words:
"When a will is contested before probate there are two separate and distinct proceedings pending before the court. One is the
petition for the probate-of the will; the other is the contest of the
probate of the will. ... The petitioner or proponent appears therein as plaintiff and tenders to all of the world all of the issues of
fact relevant to the ultimate question of the validity of the will.
While all persons interested in the estate are in a sense parties
defendant thereto, there are no defendants in the sense of active
parties litigant in this proceeding. It is in a sense an ex parte proceeding, in which the burden rests upon the petitioner to prove all
225

Mordecai v. Canty, 86 S.C. 470, 68 S.E. 1049 (1910).
Townshend v. Townshend, 7 Gill. (32 Md.) IO (1848).
227
Dickens v. Bonnewell, 160 Va. 194, 168 S.E. 610 (1933).
228
Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1944) § 371. This section appears in the
chapter on contest before probate, but see also Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1944)
§ 382, providing that proceedings on a contest after probate are to be had "as in the
case of a contest before probate."
229
192 Cal. 451 at 458, 221 P. 361 (1923).
226
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the material allegations of his petition. . . . The contest of a will,
on the other hand, while a proceeding in rem, is at the same time
an adversary proceeding. . . . The only issues of fact involved
therein are those which are framed by the allegations of the contest and the denials of the answer.... As to those issues the burden of proof rests upon the contestants. . . ."
Like conclusions are reached by the courts of other states which
follow the California type of statute just quoted. 280 It is not easy,
however, to give a rational explanation of such legislation. As the
California court observed in its opinion in Estate of Latour,281 "We are
unable to see any good reason for our somewhat peculiar statutory provisions so far as a contest before probate is concerned, but we must take
the law as we find it."

3. Effect of prior decree admitting will to probate
Whether the prior decree admitting the will to probate is to be
regarded as competent evidence in a contest after probate is believed
to be of some significance in determining the character of that contest.
If the contest is to be regarded as essentially a retrial of the issue of
will or no will, then the decree on the former hearing would not be
admissible. On the other hand, if the contest after probate is essentially a proceeding to set aside a perfectly valid decree, then we may
admit that decree as evidence of the due execution of the will. Of
course, as pointed out by the North Carolina court,282 the fact that
a statute declares that the decree in the first probate is "conclusive in
evidence of the validity of the will" can have application only to a collateral attack on the will and not to the contest after probate, which is
a direct attack.
In the absence of statute, courts have generally held that the decree
admitting the will to probate is not admissible. 288 The argument against
280

Head v. Nixon, 22 Idaho 765, 128 P. 557 (1912); In re Bragg's Estate, 106
Mont. 132, 76 P. (2d) 57 (1938); In re Hanson's Will, 50 Utah 207, 167 P. 256
(1917); Wood v. Wood, 25 Wyo. 26, 164 P. 844 (1917) (the Wyoming statute
does not state that the contestant is plaintiff). See also I BANcRoFr's PROBATE PRACTICE§ 204 (1928).
281
140 Cal. 414 at 421, 73 P. 1070, 74 P. 441 (1903).
282
Wellsv. Odum, 205 N.C. 110 at 111,170 S.E. 145 (1933).
288
Craig v. Southard, 14.8 Ill. 37, 35 N.E. 361 (1893); Davis v. Upson, 209
Ill. 206, 70 N.E. 602 (1904); Edwards v. Gaulding, 38 Miss. 118 (1859) (now
overruled by statute); Wells v. Odum, 205 N.C. 110, 170 S.E. 145 (1933); In re
Will of Williams, 215 N.C. 259, 1 S.E. (2d) 857 (1939); Dickens v. Bonnewell, 160
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admitting the decree is particularly strong where the hearing on the
original probate was ex parte or was without notice to interested parties.
.As was observed by the North Carolina court,284 "The proceedings in
· common form before the clerk are ex ·parte, and not binding on the
caveators, who were not parties." In a few states statutes expressly
provide that the decree admitting the will to probate is evidence to
prove the due execution of the will in the contest after probate.285
Perhaps, also, ·the California statute making the contestant "the plaintiff, may have that effect.236
The precise question here considered should be distinguished from
the question whether the testimony of the subscribing witnesses as given
in the original hearing can be introduced in the contest after probate.
A number of statutes do allow the admission of such evidence,287
although most of them restrict it to cases where the witnesses are not
available in the proceeding before probate. It is interesting to note
that, in at least two states, it has been held that a statute permitting the
introduction of the testimony of subscribing witnesses as given on the
original probate should not be construed to permit the introduction
of the decree admitting the will to probate.288 The reason apparently
was that the contest was a retrial of the issue as far as possible, and that
Va. 194, 168 S.E. 610 (1933). Contra: In re Estate of Holloway, 195 Cal. 711, 235
P. 1012 (1925). See alsq Frazie's Executrix v. Frazie, 186 Ky. 613 at 623, 217
s.w. 668 (1919).
234
In re Will of Chisman, 175 N.C. 420 at 421, 95 S.E. 769 (1918).
285
Miss. Code Ann., (1942) § 507; Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1937) §
12083; Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932) § 1387.
286
In re Estate of Holloway, 195 Cal. 711, 235 P. 1012 (1925).
287
Ala. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 61, § 67,; Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) § 38-212;
Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope, 1937) § 14539; Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1944) § 374;
Idaho Laws Ann. (1943) § 15-217; Ill. Ann. Stat, (Smith-Hurd, 1941) c, .3, § 223;
Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 7-602; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1944) § 394.270; Miss.
Code Ann. ( 1942); § 508; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann; ( l 942) § 541; Mont. Rev. Code
Ann. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) § 10036; Nev. Comp. Laws (Hillyer, Supp.
1941) § 9882.21; N.M. Stat. Ann. (1941) § 32-209; N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Michie,
1943) § 31-35; N.D. Rev. Code (1943) § 30-0606; Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page,
1938) § 12084; Okla. Stat. Ann. (1941) tit. 58, § 44; S.D. Code Ann. (1939) §
35.0304; Utah Code Ann. (1943) § 102-3-9; Va. Code Ann (Michie, 1942) § 5261;
Wyo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Courtright, 1931) § 88-606. All of these states except Alabama
and Illinois limit the use of such testimony to cases where the witness is unavailable for
stated reasons; in these two states, however, the testimony can apparently be used
regardless of the availability of the witness.
288
Craig v. Southard, 148 Ill. 37, 35 N.E. 361 (1893); Dickens v. Bonnewell,
160 Va. 194, ~68 S.E. 610 (1933). See also Kay v. Elston, 205 Ala. 307, 87 S. 525
(1920).
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to inform the jury of the decree in the former hearing would be unduly prejudicial to the contestants.

4. Jury trial in contest after probate
While it is generally held that the constitutional right to jury trial
does not include a jury in a will contest,289 the statutes of a majority
of the states do give the right to a jury trial in such a proceeding.240
Sometimes it is provided that a jury trial may be had either in contest
before probate or in contest after probate, but not in both contests.241
Sometimes, though the provision for contest after probate calls for
trial before a court, a jury trial may be had on an appeal with trial de
novo. 242 In a few states a jury triaJ- cannot be had as a matter of
right; 248 and it is interesting to note that among these are two states
289
Cummins v. Cummins, 1 Marv. (15 Del.) 423, 31 A. 816 (1895); Wainwright v. Bartlett, 51 Nev. 170, 271 P. 689 (1928); Fleming's Estate, 265 Pa. 399,
109 A. 265 (1919); State v. Nieuwenhuis, 49 S.D. 181, 207 N.W. 77 (1926); Will
of Weidman, 189 Wis. 318, 207 N.W. 950 (1926). See annotation in 62 A.L.R.
82(1929).
240
Ala. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 61, §§ 52, 63, 67; Ariz. Code Ann. (1939)
§§ 38-210, 38-2II, 38-218; Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope, 1937) §§ 14543, 14545; Cal.
Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1944), §§ 371, 382; Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1935) c.
176, § 63; Del. Rev. Code (1935) § 3802 (register "shall have power" to order a
jury); D.C. Code (1940) § 19-312; Idaho Laws Ann. (1943) §§ 15-213, 15-214,
15-226; Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1941) c. 3, § 244; Iowa Code (Reichmann,
1939) § 11864; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, Supp. 1943) §§ 59-2212, 59-2408
(amended Laws 1945, c. 237) (no jury unless court calls one in an advisory capacity);
Ky. Rev. Stat. (1944) §§ 394.260, 394.290; Me. Rev.' Stat. (1944) c. 140, § 37
(jury "may" be ordered); Mass. Ann. Laws (Michie, 1932) c. 215, § 16 (issues
"m'ay" be sent to superior court for trial by jury); Mich. Stat. Ann. ( 1943) § 27.3178
(42); Minn. Stat. (1941) § 525.72 (no jury unless court orders one); Miss. Code
Ann. (1942) § 503; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1942 and Supp. 1945) §§ 538, 539;
Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (Anderson & McFarland 1935) §§ 10032, 10045; Nev.
Comp. Laws (Hillyer, Supp. 1941) §§ 9882.18, 9882.24; N.H. Rev. Laws (1942)
c. 365, § 11; N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §§ 3:2-31, 3:2-33; N.M. Stat. Ann. (1941)
§ 32-210; N.Y. Surr. Ct. Act (Cahill, 1937) § 147; Ohio Gen. Code Ann (Page,
Supp. 1945) § 12082; Okla. Stat. Ann. (1941) tit. 58, § 735 (discretionary); Pa.
Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1944) tit. 20, § 1961; R.l. Gen. Laws Ann. (1938) c.
573, § 4; S.D. ·Code Ann (1939) § 35.2111; Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1938)
§ 8110; Vt. Pub. Laws (1933) §§ 3003, 3016 (amended Laws 1941, No. 42); Va.
Code Ann (Michie, 1942) 5257; W. Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1943) § 4068; Wis.
Stat. (1943) § 324.17; Wyo. Rev. Stat, Ann. (Courtright, 1931) § 88-602.
241
Cal. Prob. Code Ann, (Deering, 1944) §§ 371, 382.
242
S.D. Code Ann (1939) § 35.2111.
248
Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, Supp. 1943) §§ 59-2212, 59-2408 (amended
Laws 1945, c. 237); Bell v. Skinner, 119 Kan. 286, 239 P. 965 (1925); Maddy v.
Hock, 134 Kan. 15, 4 P. (2d) 408 (1931); Minn. Stat. (1941) § 525.72; Okla.
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which have recently revised completely their probate codes; namely
Minnesota and Kansas.
One may well inquire why the jury trial in will contest cases is so
universal in the United States in view of the fact that no such procedure was followed by the English ecclesiastical courts, on which to
some extent our probate procedure is modeled. The answer would
seem to be that, when wills involving land came to be probated_ in
this country just as wills of personalty, it was felt that the jury trial,
which was always assured in an action of ejectment in England to try
title to devised land, should be incorporated into our probate procedure. It will be recalled that, though English chancery sometimes
compelled heirs and devisees to conduct a contest in a common law
court to determine the validity of a devise of land, the chancellor did
not undertake to override the institution of jury trial in the common
Jaw court. If the jury in the action of ejectment on feigned issues did
not reach a result pleasing to the chancellor, he did not undertake to
decide the facts himself, but sent the case back to the common law
court for another trial by another jury. 244
In this country a variety of answers can be made to the question,
what kind of jury trial is provided for in a contest. Sometimes the
conclusion of the courts is that a common law jury trial has been provided; 245 sometimes that a trial before an equity jury is called for and
that therefore the verdict is purely advisory. 246 It has also been said
,Stat. Ann. (1941) tit. 58, § 735; In re DeVine's Estate, 188 Okla. 423, 109 P. (2d)
1078 (1941).
244 Pemberton v. Pemberton, 13 Vesey 290 (1807). After three juries had found
in favor of the will, the court refused to direct a fourth trial, saying that if a fourth trial
should result in a verdict against the_ will he would have to direct a fifth trial.
245
Lambert v. Foley, 237 Ala. 131, 186 S. 138 (1939); Estate of Green, 25 Cal.
(2d) 535, 154 P. (2d) 692 (1944); Smith v. Henline, 174 Ill. 184, 51 N.E. 227
(1898); Beatty v. Caldwell, 210 Ky. 559, 276 S.W. 547 (1925); Struth v. Decker,
102 Md. 496 at 500, 62 A. 709 (1906); Dowling v. Luisetti, 351 Mo. 514, 173
S.W. (2d) 381 (1/943); Barnes v. Bess, 171 Va. 1, 197 S.E. 403 (1938) (deois(J!/1,t
vel non).
246

Cummins v. Cummins, l Marv. (15 Del.) 423, 31 A. 816 (1895); Maddy
Hock, 134 Kan. 15, 4 P. (2d) 408 (1931); Hannon v. Gorman, 296 Mass. 437,
6 N.E. (2d) 433 (1937); Wainwright v. Bartlett, 51 Nev. 170, 271 P. 689 (1928);
In re DeVine's Estate, 188 Okla. 423, 109 P. (2d) 1078 (1941); Keller v. Lawson,
261 Pa. 489, 104 A. 678 (1918); State v. Nieuwenhuis, 49 S.D. 181, 207 N.W. 77
(1926); Redford v. Booker, 166 Va. 561, 185 S.E. 879 (1936) (distinguishing an
issue out of chancery from an action of demsar;it vel non); In re Jolly's Estate, 197
Wash. 349, 85 P. (2d) 267 (1938); Will of Weidman, 189 Wis. 318, 207 N.W.
950 (1926).
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that the statutory provisions for jury trial preserve the historical situation just described in which a court of equity sends the issue of devisavit
vel non to the law court to be tried.247 If that be true, the court may or
may not accept the finding of the jury; but if it does not, then the case
must be tried before another jury. Essentially, however, it is regarded
as a common law jury trial.
One may well conclude that the retention of jury trial as a matter
of right in will contests is largely due to historical reasons. But the
issues of fact would seem to be of a sort which could better be dealt
with by a court than by a jury.

5. Time limitations on contest after probate
Statutory provisions limiting the time within which a contest can
be initiated are practically 'universal.248 The time limitation for contest
247
ln re Gleason, 96 Misc. 397, 160 N.Y.S. 220 (1916); In re Barlow's Will,
180 App. Div. 860, 168 N.Y.S. 131 (1917).
248
In the following list the period given is that for contest after probate unless
otherwise stated; in states having both contest after probate and appeal with trial de
novo, only the former period is given unless otherwise indicated. Ala. Code Ann.
(1940) tit. 61, §§ 64, 66 (six months; and if no contest has been had, infants and
persons of unsound ~ind have twelve months after a guardian is appointed or disabilities removed, but in no case over twenty years); Ariz. Code. Ann. (1939)
§§ 38-216, 38-221 (one year; infants and persons of unsound mind have one year after
removal of disability); Ark. Laws 1941, Act 401 [appears in Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope,
Supp. 1944) at p. 553] (six months after a probate without notice); Ark. Dig. Stat.
(Pope, 1937) § 14545 (persons not personally served may contest in chancery within
three years, and infant not a party to such a suit is not bound until twelve months
after attaining majority); Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1944) §§ 380, 384 (six
months; infants and persons of unsound mind who were not parties to the proceeding
have six months after removal of disability); Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1935) c. 176,
§ 65 (a person not summoned on the probate has one year to contest; infants and persons non compos mentis have one year after removal of disability); Conn. Gen. Stat.
(1930) §§ 4991, 4992 (amended Supp. 1939, § 1306e) (appeal with trial de novo:
one month, or twelve months for persons who had no notice; minors have twelve
months after attaining majority); Del. Rev. Code (1935) § 3801 (one year); D.C.
Code (1940) § 19-309 (three months for a will of personalty; one year for a will of
realty as to persons actually served or personally appearing, and two years as to other
persons; minors have one year after attaining majority); Fla. Stat. Ann. (1941)
§ 732.30 (any time before final discharge of the personal representative); Ga. Code
Ann. (Park, 1936) § 113-605 (seven years; minors have four years after attaining
majority, but a contest by a minor after the general period of limitation does not affect any rights other than the minor's); Idaho Laws Ann. (1943) §§ 15-223, 15-229
(the first section states a limitation of four months; the second allows eight months,
and infants and persons of unsound mind have eight months after removal of disability); Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1941) c. 3, § 242 (nine months); Ind. Stat.
Ann. (Burns, Supp. 1943) § 7-504 (one year after the will is offered for probate; in-
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after probate designated as such runs from a period under twelve
months in most of the states in the California group to seven years in
some of the southern states. As might be expected, the period in which
a contest may be had in th:e form of an appeal with trial de nova is
usually very short.- While it may not at first be entirely apparent why
it is true, it would seem that the length of the period in which the confants, persons of unsound mind and persons absent from the state have three years after
the will is offered for probate); Iowa Code (Reichmann, 1939) § uoo7, subd. 3 (two
years from the time the will is filed in the clerk's office and notice thereof is given; but
if after probate the executor causes personal notice of the probate to be served, the
limitation is one year after such service); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, Supp. 1943)
§ 59-2404 (amended Laws 1945, c. 237) (appeal with trial d:e novo; nine months);
Ky. Rev. Stat. (1944) §§ 394.240, 394.280 (appeal with trial de novo: five years; a
person residing out of the state and proceeded against by warning order only, and a
person not having personal service and not appearing, may petition in equity within
three years after the decision on appeal; infants have twelve months after attaining
majority to bring a similar action; these equity actions operate no further than necessary to protect the rights of the plaintiff); Me. Rev. Stat. (1944) c. 140, § 32 (appeal
with trial de novo: twenty days; a person beyond the sea or out of the United States,
with no attorney in the state has twenty days. after his return or appointment of an attorney); Md. Code Ann. (Flack, 1939) art. 93, § 357 (one year); Mich. Stat. Ann.
(1943) §§ 27.3178(36), 27.3178(45) (appeal with trial de novo: twenty days, and
court may extend for an additional forty days; a person out of the United States at the
time of the decree has three months after his return, if within two years after the
decree and administration has not been completed); Minn. Stat. (1941) § 525.712
(appeal with trial de novo: thirty days after service of notice of filing the order appealed from, or six months in the absence of such notice); Miss. Code Ann. (1942)
§ 505 (two years; infants and persons of unsound mind have two years after removal
of disability); Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1942 and Supp. 1945) §§ 538, 540 (one year;
infants and persons of unsound mind have one year after removal of disabilities); Mont.
Rev. Code Ann. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) §§ 10042, 10048 (one year; infants
and persons of unsound mind Have one year after removal of disabilities); Neb. Rev.
Stat. (1943) § 30-1602 (appeal with trial de novo: thirty days); Nev. Comp. Laws
(Hillyer, Supp. 1941) § 9882.22 (three months); N.H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 351,
§§ 7, 9 (one year, if no appeal has been prosecuted; infants, insane persons or those out
of the United States have one year after removal of disability); N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937)
§ 3:2-52 (appeal, which may be de novo: three months, or six months if the appellant
resided out of the state at the time of death of the testator); N.M. Stat. Ann ( I 941 and
Supp. 1945) §§ 32-212, 32-215, 32-220 (six months for contest in'the probate court;
three months for appeal to the district court with trial de novo); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann.
(Michie, 1943) § 3 1-3 2 ( seven years; minors, insane and imprisoned persons have
three years after removal of disability); N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §30-0608 (one year);
Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1937 and Supp. 1945) §§ 10504-32, 12087 (six months:
persons under disability have six months after removal of disability, but bona fide purchasers not affected); Okla. Stat. Ann. (1941) tit. 58, §·61, 67 (one year; infants and
persons of unsound mind have one year after removal of disability); Ore. Comp. Laws
(1940) §19-208 (amended Laws 1945, c. 185) (six months after entry of court order
in court journal; persons under disability have six months after removal of disability);
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 20, § 2005 (appeal with trial de novo: two years,
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test may be brought has a direct relation to the function of contest after
probate. If the period is short, we may expect to have the contest before
final distribution in practically all c<\ses. And if, also, the final order of
distribution is the significant decree in determining the successors in
interest to the title of the decedent, then we can have no questions about
the rights of persons claiming under the first probate.249 The contest
would be regarded as a complete retrial of the issue, and would supersede the decree in the first probate. But no real hardship would result
because no decree of distribution would be made prior to the contest.
If the period is long, we may still look upon the contest as a retrial
of the issue as did the English lawyers with respect to the probate in
solemn form in the ecclesiastical courts; 250 but, on the other hand, modern demands for a speedy, final distribution are likely to result in having the contest treated as a kind of proceeding to set aside a valid judgment. Thus a bona fide purchaser from a distributee under the original
but the court may cite anyone to show cause why he should not appeal within six months
from the date of such citation); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. (1938) c. 573, § 1 (appeal with
trial de novo: forty days); S.C. Code Ann. (1942) § 8932, subd. 3 (one year; infants
have one year after removal of disability); S.D. Code Ann. (1939) §§35.0306,
35)()312 (one year; infants and persons of unsound mind have one year after removal
of disability); Tenn. Code Ann. (MicMe, 1938) §§ 8II2, 8574 (seven years; infants
and persons of unsound mind have three years from removal of disability); Tex. Civ.
Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1941) § 5534 (contest: four years); Tex. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule
332 (appeal with trial de novo: fifteen days); Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1945) § 1023-12 (six months); Vt. Pub. Laws (1933) §3005 (appeal with trial de novo: twenty
days); Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1942) §§ 5259, 5260 (one year; infants and persons
of unsound mind have one year after removal of disability; persons residing out of the
state or notified only by publication have two years after the order appealed from);
Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932) § 1385 (six months); W.Va. Code Ann.
(Michie, 1943) §§ 4071, 4072 (two years; infants, convicts and insane persons have
one year after removal of disability; persons residing out of the state or proceeded
against by publication have two years after the order appealed from); Wis. Stat. (1943)
§§ 324.01 (appeal with trial de novo in counties under 15,000 population: sixty
days); Wyo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Courtright, 1931) §§ 88-701, 88-707 (amended Laws
1945, c. 3, 52) (six months).
249
Since it is generally the law that the personal representative has title to personalty of the estate, a distribution of personalty by him under a decree admitting a will
to probate or ordering distribution of the estate would clearly pass title. If, however,
the subject matter in question is 'land, the heir or devisee would have title. If the order
admitting the will to probate is the significant order, a difficult question arises as to
whether a bona fide purchaser from the devisee is protected, when, on a contest, probate is thereafter revoked. See 36 M1cH. L. REv. 120 (1937). If, however, the significant decree which confirms the title of the devisee is the order of distribution, and
if contest takes place before the order of distribution, this problem does not arise.
250
In the ecclesiastical courts the period for instituting probate in solemn form
was thirty years after probate in common form. See note 3, supra.
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probate may well be protected even though the property involved is
land. 251
One of the most readily discernible trends in will contest legislation is the tendency to shorten the period of limitation. Thus the California type of legislation, which originally provided for a time limitation of one year,252 has been changed to provide for limitation of six
months in California and Utah, and three months in Nevada. Virginia,
which at one time imposed a limitation period of seven years,253 now
provides for a period of one year in most cases.
In most of the statutes, the period of limitation is extended for the
benefit of persons under a disability, though in a few no such exception
exists. Such provisions have been a source of litigation. Some courts
have concluded that the revocation of probate on the petition of a contestant who was under a disability after the general limitation period
had elapsed would apply only to the person who had been under a
disability.254 Thus we would have the surprising conclusion that,
though in general the contest proceeding is in rem,255 the will is held
valid as to some persons and void as to others. Other courts have
reached the more rational conclusion that, if the will is set aside after
the general limitation period has expired, it is nevertheless set aside as
to all interested persons.256
In discussing time limitations, it should not be overlooked that in
many states an after discovered will can be produced after the statutory
period of limitation has expired,257 since the probate of the after discovered will is not regarded as a contest within the meaning of the
statute. Indeed, in some states the production of an after discovered
will is expressly excepted from the operation of the limitation statute.258
Without going into this problem to any extent, it may be observed that

a

251

See 36 MicH. L. REV. 120 (1937), and note 249, supra.
See note 107, supra.
253
See note 64, supra.
254
Security Trust and Sav. Bank v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. App. (2d) 551, 69 P.
(2d) 921 (1937); Spencer v. Spencer, 31 Mont. 631, 79 P. 320 (1905). See also
Ga. Code Ann. (Park, 1936) § u3-605; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1944) § 394.280.
255
See Simes, "The Administraticn of a Decedent's Estate as a Proceeding in
Rem," 43 MICH. L. REV. 675 at 680 (1945).
256
McCann v. Ellis, 172 Ala. 60, 55 S. 303 (1911).
257
Abdill v. Abdill, 295 Ill. 40, 128 N.E. 741 (1920); Waters v. Stickney, 12
Allen ( 94 Mass.) I, 90 Am. Dec. I 22 ( I 866) ; In re Elliott's Estate, (Wash. 1945)
156 P. (2d) 427. In general, see 107 A.L.R. 249 (1937); 157 A.L.R. 1351 (1945).
258
Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1944) § 38 5; Nev. Comp. Laws (Hillyer,
Supp. 1941) § 9882.27.
252
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the production of an after discovered will should be considered a contest. Since a probate should determine that the instrument is the last
will of the testator, the probate of a later will is a contest of the first
probate. Moreover, no good reason is perceived why the production of
an after discovered will should be treated differently from any other
after discovered evidence. It is true, wills are frequently concealed and
cannot be found at the time of the first hearing, but so is other evidence.
In some jurisdictions the contest statute expressly applies to the production of an after discovered will, and the time limitation, therefore, is
also applicable.259

VII
CONCLUSION: IMPROVING AMERICAN TYPES OF CONTESTS;
RECOMMENDED LEGISLATION

We have seen that in a considerable number of states the will contest after probate constitutes a procedural anomaly: legislators do not
appear to have realized whence it came nor whither it is going. Adapting the English probate in solemn form, they have added provisions
for notice before probate and sometimes also provisions for an appeal
with trial de novo after probate. Thus they have permitted two, or
even three, contests although notice to interested parties is given prior
to the first contest. In so doing, they appear to have lost sight of the
only reason justifying a contest after probate, the absence of notice and
the summary character of the first probate.
Whether we should provide for contest after probate in any case
will depend, then, upon whether we desire to permit probate without
notice. Without going into that issue exhaustively, it is possible to observe that strong arguments do exist for the initiation of probate without notice. It is a procedure which permits an immediate supervision
of the estate without the appointment of a special administrator; it
saves expense in the vast majority of cases where there is no desire on
the part of anyone to contest the will; it is in accord with the present
English practice which has been followed in that country for centuries.
By way of summary, it may be suggested that legislation on will
contests should accord with the following propositions:
I. If original probate is without notice, then notice to interested
parties should immediately follow; and a short period for contest
should be permitted.
N.D. Rev. Code (1943) § 30-0608; Okla. Stat. Ann. (1941) tit. 58, § 61;
S.D. Code Ann. (1939) § 35.0306.
259
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2. This period should not be extended beyond the time of the final
order of distribution.
3. No extension of time should be permitted in the case of persons
under disability. After all, they can act through guardians; and it seems
unreasonable to hold up the ultimate determination of title to the estate
until after their disabilities are removed.
·
4. A jury trial should be permitted only in the sound discretion of
the court; it should not be a matter of right.
5. The contest after probate should be regarded as a retrial of the
issue of will or no will which was presented at the original probate;
not a proceeding to set aside a judgment. Thus it will be a part of a
single proceeding to probate the will. and administer the estate; proponents will have the same burden of proof which they had on the
initial probate; evidence introduced at the original probate will only be
admitted in exceptional cases where the witnesses .cannot be produced
to testify anew, or where the proposition to be proved is not controverted by the contestants.
6. The production of an after discovered will should be barred at
the time of the decree of distribution just as other grounds of contest.
ff these principles are embodied ~n contest legislation, it will cease
to be an amended edition of a procedural institution which is forgotten;
and will become merely a device necessitated by the fact that probate
is commonly administrative and without notice, and that a trial of the
issue of will or no will is the excepti?n and not the rule.

